I’m drawn this week to the topic of workplace safety. Many workers' compensation accidents result from a failure of safety precautions. It is common for the industry to have managers on site whose only role is monitoring and enforcing safety protocols, regulations, and laws. A great many of those are proclaimed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), but various states have regulations as well.
Early in my career, I encountered a situation involving a large piece of industrial equipment. An industrial facility had deemed this equipment's performance substandard and had brought in a team of professionals to perform upgrades. The team included multiple vendors: electricians, software technicians, mechanics, welders, and more. A major goal in such "shut down" processes is speed, so multiple experts engage in various work simultaneously. The interest is in completing the job and getting that expensive machine (and the whole plant) up and running again. Seldom do manufacturing machines make money when idle.
Somehow, between those multiple crews, each supervisor had assumed that one of the others had accomplished something called "lockout tag out." And, the one thing upon which everyone later agreed was that they were all wrong. Notably, "lockout tag out" is the subject of a specific OSHA regulation: 1910.147 - The control of hazardous energy (lockout/tagout).
"This section requires employers to establish a program and utilize procedures for affixing appropriate lockout devices or tagout devices to energy isolating devices, and to otherwise disable machines or equipment to prevent unexpected energization, start up or release of stored energy in order to prevent injury to employees." 1910.147(A)(3)(i)
Lock out/tag out is the equivalent of unplugging your lamp from the wall before you attempt to replace the switch inside it (and perhaps having someone hold the plug in their hand while you work to preclude accidental re-energizing). Throughout the industrial world, electricity is routed to machines through conduit, which is periodically interrupted with junction boxes. These junction boxes have switches that can interrupt power flow. And, there are a variety of methods by which some or all of the circuits can be both neutralized and marked (tagged) or locked. Many have a large "knife" switch on the outside which can be locked with padlocks (plural).
The appropriate process may be for each person, or at least team, working upon a piece of equipment to place his/her own lock upon that switch. When you or your team is finished, and clear, you remove your own lock. But, because you do not have the key to another persons lock, others are still restrained from re-energizing that machine until all locks are removed. In other instances someone may lock such power and be responsible for assuring all teams/persons are clear before restoration. The point is that each person/team is assured of being clear and thus safe by removing her/his/their own lock, or being supervised.
In the instance years ago, when that machine was inadvertently triggered, it cycled in its normal designed manner and essentially ingested one of the contractors. This was, obviously, a fatality event for one worker, but in the later testimony I was told repeatedly how traumatic it was for literally everyone else in the facility, whether they witnessed it or not, knew that person or not, had ever even seen that machine or not. It was a very traumatic experience even for the folks in the business office who never even ventured into the production area where the machine was located. With complete detachment, those people were nonetheless traumatized by this senseless death.
With multiple vendors on site, there was significant post-accident finger-pointing. Certainly, an element of that was the significant financial liability. Tragically, though it is rarely discussed, employee fatalities are often far less expensive than other serious injuries in the nation's worker’s compensation programs. There is a tragic finality to death that is perversely viewed as less worthy of compensation than disability and restrictions. It is even possible for the estate of a worker without dependents to not be entitled to substantive death benefits at all. In some instances, only funeral expenses will be covered. See Reminded About Death Benefits (February 2019).
In addition to financial responsibility, finger-pointing is also the product of our human emotions. We are all hard-wired to not blame ourselves for bad events, even minor ones. Psychology Today has some guidance for us about that. It may be very hard to accept responsibility for causing injury, tragedy, or the finality of death. It is emotionally difficult to step forward, look responsibility in the eye, and say “That man died because of me.“ Of course, this is not a universal truth. There are those in our world who possess no capacity for empathy, sympathy, or commiseration. This may be as simple as empathy deficit disorder or as complex as sociopathy or psychopathy. But, most of us fall without those challenges.
Returning to the present, I have been a gun enthusiast for decades. I visit gun ranges, target shoot, and socialize. I have hunted a few times, but frankly lack the patience required of both this and fishing. I have repeatedly encountered people in public with an obvious pistol upon their belt (yes, that is a real thing in various states). It may not be normal or experienced everywhere, but there are places where it is not uncommon.
Often, in such settings, I have complemented a weapon. Occasionally, the owner will proffer it to me. At times, I have also simultaneously received the reassuring “it’s not loaded," or seen them clear the gun before handing it to me. Every time, in every circumstance, my immediate action is identical. First, I receive the weapon keeping it pointed down-range or to the ground. It is a conscious and persistent decision that the weapon never be pointed at a person. Guns are dangerous, and there is nothing more dangerous than a purportedly "unloaded" gun.
Second, in no way meaning to question anyone’s credibility, honesty, or sincerity, my second step is to personally examine the weapon. I drop the clip if they have not. I lock back the slide and visually inspect the chamber. I open the action. If it is a revolver, I open the cylinder. Upon verification of a complete absence of ammunition, I return to the practices in the first step above, never pointing at a person. It is by this time verified by me to be unloaded. Nonetheless, I treat it like what it is: a potentially dangerous device. As Marc Shean of USACarry noted:
"If you don’t have the mindset that they are all loaded, and ready to fire, you are a prime candidate for a firearm accident, you assume too much, take to much for granted."
GunCraftTraining recommends:
"Rule #1: Treat every gun as if it is loaded. Even if you know the gun is unloaded, treat it with the same level of respect as you would a loaded gun."
The Internet is full of similar advice. I find myself having sympathy for the Director of Photography Halyna Hutchin and her family and friends. She was senselessly killed by complacency and stupidity. Unfortunately, these two kill many people every year. An actor making a movie pointed a gun at Ms. Hutchin and pulled the trigger. She died, and the bullet passed through to injure Director Joel Souza, according to CNN. One is dead, another is injured, and the entire event was absolutely avoidable. That is not to say accidents do not happen, but clearly, this tragedy was avoidable, with greater precaution, communication, or care - avoidable. With a little training, a little attention, a little caution - avoidable. Thus, the death is senseless and disturbing.
Hannah Gutierrez was the armorer on this movie set. She was responsible for the inventory of weapons being used in the movie. Like the overall project manager discussed above, she had full control of the lock on the electricity, the gun, the ammunition, and the threat. She kept guns stored and secured. According to Deadline, she "has no idea where the live rounds came from.” According to the British Broadcasting Corporation, Assistant Director Dave "Halls had handed the gun to (actor) Baldwin during a rehearsal and called out 'cold gun' as he did so." How did Halls get access to the gun? How did it get loaded? Where are the failsafe constraints?
Actor Alec Baldwin was an actor on this movie set. He pointed the gun and perhaps pulled the trigger. In any event, the weapon discharged in his custody, and two people were shot, one died. Mr. Baldwin has spoken about the shooting, in what The Daily Beast describes as a "tense faceoff." That report includes Mr. Baldwin's wife's expression that "she is worried her husband will develop PTSD." Nickiswift.com has a somewhat unflattering history of Mr. Baldwin's past. Some might conclude that he is perhaps high-strung or emotional to begin with. Regardless, I suspect that anyone in his position is likely to be troubled deeply about the responsibility that comes with someone's death at his own hands.
The finger-pointing has begun in this situation. Who put live rounds in that gun? Where did they come from and what were they doing on a movie set? In what instance is a live round ever needed in a movie? Why was the gun sitting unattended where someone could pick it up? Why did anyone pick up this weapon and pass it on assuming it was safe, not checking that it was? Why did anyone who received this weapon, including the actor, assume that it was safe, or "cold," or not? Did someone pull the trigger, or did this gun just volitionally fire itself? Did these various personnel receive even basic instruction on assuring that a gun is safe before it is handled further?
Some critics have explained that under most circumstances no weapon is pointed at others in filming a scene. When the angle cannot be adjusted, and the scene absolutely requires a weapon to be pointed directly at the camera, presumably it is possible for the area behind/around the camera to be completely evacuated. Or, some have discussed that one might place a shield between a weapon and the crew filming a movie, the directors, and others in those "must point" situations. Still, others remind us that in the modern world, any scene can be filmed with a rubber gun and the reality can be substituted in later ("post-production") with computer-generated imagery (CGI). Presumably, the tragic death of Ms. Hutchin was completely, indisputably, avoidable.
There will be, has been, discussion about who is responsible for her death. At the end of the day, when one holds a weapon in their hands, that is their responsibility. It remains theirs even if someone else tells them it is safe, unloaded, or "cold." If I hold it, the direction in which it is pointed remains my responsibility. The avoidance of the trigger is my choice. All of the responsibility is ultimately upon whoever holds the weapon. Certainly, if I pass the weapon to someone else, I retain some responsibility. But, like the lockout/tag out, it is ultimately the responsibility of whoever is holding it. Trained or not, assured or not, serious or not, whoever holds it is responsible.
Whether criminal charges are filed in this instance or not, someone is dead and at least one other is injured. As with other events happening every day, someone is injured or killed due to complacency, haste, or inadvertence. There will be implications in workers' compensation for these employees. There may be implications in a civil setting regarding whether coworkers face liability for damages to the wounded or the estate of Ms. Hutchin. But, the criminal charge decision will be utterly separate. The potential for OSHA fines will be utterly separate. There are a multitude of legal and contractual issues to be worked through in this and any similar workplace death.
But, in the end, all of that will be secondary to the fact that someone was killed, and injured, by a coworker. That, regardless of the ultimate facts found or laws applied, was completely and utterly avoidable with a minimum of due care, patience, and intellect. While our society improves persistently, 5,333 American workers nonetheless died on the job in 2019, according to OSHA. That is almost 15 per day. Unfortunately, accidents happen and tragically many are serious. Too many are fatal. Perhaps, too many of them are 100% avoidable and result from poor training, haste, inattention, and worse.
The final outcome in New Mexico will be of interest. But Ms. Hutchin's death is a reminder for all workers. You are always responsible for the safety of yourself and those around you, always. This responsibility is only increased when you deal with vehicles, machines, electricity, guns, etc. Every worker has a brain, should be blessed with training, and needs to remain focused. Safety is job one, and getting everyone on the crew back home in one piece at the end of the day is critical. Much to consider, but every tragedy should be avoided when possible.
Despite any protestations or alibi, it doesn't matter if you didn't know the gun was loaded; knowing was your job. Safety was your job, your responsibility, your duty. If your finger was on the trigger, the guy in the mirror failed.
