HALT Act Delayed

In 2022, Congress passed a law, part of a bigger spending package, that mandated the implementation of passive driver monitoring in American authomobiles. See Safety is Coming (March 2022). The main focus of this effort is to diminish impaired driving. There are various cars on the road today that already encourage driver performance.

I recently rented a late-model vehicle. I usually reserve the base models, but am grateful to be upgraded on a reasonably regular basis. I never get a luxury or sports car, but still.

The vehicle I drove in February was a signifiant upgrade (I elect not to share either agency or model). I have had vehicles suggest that I take a breack before. Usually that is because the manufacturer installed a large gas tank mated to high fuel economy, and if the car's range is 400 miles I am likely to drive four or more hours at a time without stopping.

I once made Paradise to almost Wildwood (407 miles) in one leg. Nonetheless, that vehicle thought I should take a break after about 2 hours, before I hit Tallahassee. The recent vehicle in February thought I should take a break in Milton, about 15 miles from Paradise.

I later checked why. That manufacturer is moving toward "analyzing driving patterns," including steering, braking, lane changes, and more. This data is analyzed in search of performance measure and suggests "a break" based on performance.

It does not measure how diffidult it is figure out how to work the tools in their cars, and why air, radio, and windshield wipers cannot operate in a simple manner that does not require touch screens, menus, and more. Hint: make your car simple to drive and we might all be able to keep a better eye on the road.

So, the Halt Drunk Driving Act (part of the "2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act") was passed largely on partisan lines. It requires the

"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to write new rules requiring automakers to install anti-drunken-driving technology in new cars within five years after passage" (November 2021).

And the clock is ticking. We find ourselves 6 months from the deadline. In January 2026, an effort to repal the Halt act failed, according to Kelley Blue Book). Critics call the effort "a kill switch," and argue that the governmetn will gain the ability to "deactivate all cars remotely." While proponents insist there is no move to disable cars, Kelley asys "the law arguably creates a kill switch."

Kelley represents that the requirement is for monitoring performance, passively detect blood alcohol level," or "detect imparment and prevents or limits vehicle operation." Despite the impending deadline, the "NHTSA hasn't done anything yet."

While the technology is not here to respond to the law's demands, automakers are reportedly striving to build what has been mandated. There are efforts to employ cameras that monitor the driver's eyes and to interpret the smoothness of sterring wheel use. There seems to be consensus (for now) that in-car breathalyzer is not likley in the next iteration, but remains a potential.

That said, there seems to be acceptance that none of this will be reality within the parameters of the HALT act. Various stories about the law suggest that any real potential for implementation is likely 2030 or beyond. Big Brother will be watching, but not as soon as we thought.

The Arms Race in Academia

Two years ago, I predicted an Arms Race (May 2024). See also Another Arms Race (October 2025) and The Arms Race Continues (December 2025). My thoughts were building since AI is a Tool (October 2023).

The challenges are readily apparent to many, but perhaps obscured to some. I recently had a next-gen ask me what I mean by "arms race." Generational differences can hinder communication. The arms race is essentially a cycle in which multiple participants build bigger and better while their opponents do similarly, each striving to outdo the other. 

This was a thing in the post-WWII era as the East and West strove economically and militarily for supremacy or at least advantage. Most often, the phrase is applied to the buildup of nuclear arsenals and the threats that presents. 

In the world of AI, my thoughts on this were driven by the evolution of AI tools that can make "deep fakes," competing with software that can detect them. But more recently, I have been driven back to the topic by the dreck that is being published. 

AI is enabling a cascade of content in social media and news platforms. There are missing words, improper punctuation, and a sea of emdashes. The large language models can prolifically churn out dreck with amazing speed. I have read through volumes of it.

The AI advent has made me cautious about articles and papers. That led me to engage a number of AI and plagiarism detectors that have proliferated on the internet. But that is not where this arms race began. Remember in your youth when you thought "he started it" would gain you some ground?

The current equilibrium results from students making the first move. They elected, years ago, to purchase term papers from professional writers and other vendors. If someone wrote a great paper on Einstein at East West University in 1972, someone else could readily turn the same paper in at West East University in 1973. 

Papers and more were traded across the paradigm we called "mail," a process that involved mailing a check to some dark basement, where a quiet troglodyte would cash the check and mail a paper back to the customer. The smart customers retyped those papers. As I conclude that paragraph, I have gone back and added links so that all the antiquated terms can be accessed easily for clarity. 

The danger was two-fold:

1. First, the professor could tell a paper was way too articulate, logical, organized, etc. for a particular student. 
2. Second, the troglodytes did a poor job of making sure that only one West East student received each paper. 

Spreading and sharing information was hard in those days. It required copy machines, postage, paper, and mail. Then came the halcyon days of the internet. Digital files could be sent in an instant. If a student needed a great paper on quantum finance, they no longer needed to order a month in advance. And the plagiarism flourished. 

Companies popped up. They allowed teachers to scan and submit papers for plagiarism long before the advent of PDF and the simple plagiarism filters of today. As a paper is turned in today, it is likely to pass through a filter automatically and arrive at the professor's desktop complete with a report on what may or may not have been pilfered from someone else's thoughts. 

Companies began offering students the chance to submit their papers to an analysis platform first ("check it first" platforms). They proclaim that what they detect is "exactly what your professor will see from _________," (insert submission filter product). 

As the world advanced, along came large language models (LLMs) in which artificial intelligence saves the student all those arduous minutes of cutting and pasting from the internet to create a paper. The plagiarism is built into the LLM output. All the student has to do is ask the LLM to write a 500-word paper on quantum finance, complete with a bibliography, and within 30 to 90 seconds, the whole product is delivered. 

But what of the education industry? Well, companies developed AI detectors to go with the previous plagiarism detectors. And the "check it first" platforms evolved to offering to pre-detect that also. But they added a new feature. They will detect for free, but for a few dollars and a single click, these will "rewrite your paper to eliminate AI and plagiarism risks."

No doubt that the universities will soon have a tool to detect papers that have been "rewritten to eliminate." And the cycle will persist, and every response of a student will be answered with a tool for the teacher, and vice versa. 

The real benefit will be less of the nuisance teaching and learning (sarcasm, apologies). As more and more time is devoted to cheating or catching cheaters more effectively and efficiently, there will be less time to teach or learn quantum finance. We will succumb societally to the great dumbing of America. 

Generations will falter. Workplaces will suffer. People will fail to produce. Their employers will struggle to thrive. And it is all for the sake of cheating and the mindset that exalts being a better cheater over writing your own paper, learning, and growing. 

I am struggling not to be the old man screaming at the kids. But in all honesty, it is getting harder every day. Write your own paper, for goodness' sake. 

Ceasing Representation

A recent instance of counsel appearing on a case made the news in New Jersey. John Gelman picked up on this in his writing. I am not sure whether his is a blog or an "other," but he brings an interesting perspective. He is one of the few workers' compensation academics in the country, and our club is seemingly shrinking rather than growing.

In the New Jersey instance, a law firm noticed an appearance on behalf of the employer and PEO. Within days, contractual disputes arose between those entities, and the law firm attempted to file a new appearance solely on behalf of the PEO.

The employer moved to disqualify counsel, who had never spoken with the employer, shared information, or otherwise had opportunities to exchange confidences. The law firm declined to withdraw its representation of the PEO, and the matter made its way to the appellate court.

It illustrates and illuminates a challenge that we experience from time to time in Florida. Lawyers file notices of appearance, becoming counsel of record. They ignore the requirements for withdrawal or substitution, and they remain counsel of record. The Florida rules are elementary and fundamental:

If you file a petition or a Notice of Appearance, you are "the party's attorney of record." Rule 60Q6.104(1). What if it is a Thursday? same answer. What if I am taller than average? same answer. What if I had tuna for lunch? same answer. What if I did not mean to? same answer. 

The point is reasonably clear here. Not a lot of analysis. Not a bunch of construction or "what if" arguments. Anyone who struggles with this, please email me for questions (make sure you copy your opposing counsel or parties).

Ok, so when does someone stop being counsel of record? Well, if there is a stipulation for substitution (Rule 60Q-6.104(2)(a)) or a "motion to substitute or withdraw" (Rule 60Q-6.104(2)(b) that results in an order, then they are no longer counsel. See above for example variables that will not change the answer (tuna for lunch).

But what if I leave my current firm? You are still counsel of record. What if I change my name? You are still counsel of record. What if I file a new Notice of Appearance and alter the party(ies) I list, a different composite than the first notice? Well, you just added clients, but also still represent each for whom you have entered an appearance.

Pretty simple, actually.

Need to stop representing someone? Enter a substitution stipulation with their new counsel and file it. OR file a motion to substitute or withdraw. Until something removes you, you are counsel of record. And that may entail much, including service, due process, and even your ethical obligations.

Law firms do not represent parties. See Who Represents this Party? (November 2014). It is clear under the 60Q rules and under a variety of appellate decisions (if you believe in stare decisis) that lawyers represent parties.

Thus, filing a notice of appearance is the lawyer's acknowledgment of their own responsibility and connection. Regardless of what the notice says, the law firm of X&Z is not counsel under the 62Q rules. The lawyer at X&Z is counsel of record (she still is if she takes a new job at W&P, or Q&U). The counsel is the lawyer. Want to change that? See above. This is all somewhat Newtonian. A counsel of record will stay counsel of record until acted upon by a valid substitution or motion/order.

And New Jersey reminds us that appearance may create ethical and professional responsibilities. Counsel can accept service for a party, can speak for a party, and can even resolve issues for a party. The counsel represents, is an agent for, the party. Think jurisdictionally; an attorney appearing in a case for a party may well submit that party to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, meaning to or not. 

In New Jersey, the employer's objection to that original attorney proceeding on behalf of the PEO was a conflict of interest. Despite the attorney's protestations that he never really represented the employer, the court concluded that RPC 1.9(a) compelled the result. Filing a document that purported to represent the employer was representation, "full stop." It cannot be that simple? Well, the court said not only can it be, but it was.

The court clarified, for those who might want to imply some grey area:

“We decline to engraft a ‘no harm-no foul’ standard onto the Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly where, as here, a duty to a client is implicated.”

Simple, Newtonian litigation. Once you say you are counsel, you are counsel. There is no quibble, and you may find yourself with ethical responsibilities as a result of your professional actions. The notice of appearance is perhaps among the simplest pleadings a lawyer will ever file. Why not take a minute and make sure it is right anyway? And why not share this story with your staff so they can remind you from time to time? That might save a call to the E&O carrier, or at a minimum, embarrassment. 

Decide Better

I have been experimenting with artificial intelligence large language models (LLM) for about four years. The idea of artificial intelligence and robotics has been on my mind longer, and I have returned periodically to the topic.

I have noticed that the LLMs can be helpful for brainstorming and organization. They are also reasonably capable of editing and proofreading. But they are clearly not human, not thinking, and not generally and readily reliable.

My latest expirement pit various LLM against one another. I pinged them with the identical "prompt" (query).

"what rights does a worker injured at work in florida have"

ChatGpt (version GPT-5 Mini), a descendant of the early arrivals on the market and readily available for no charge, aptly identified the availability of medical care from workers' compensation, wage replacement, permanent disability benefits, vocational rehabilitation, and death benefits. There were some cautions about notice, the petition process, and more. Chat included a disclaimer, "AI output may not always be accurate. Check important info."

Claude, a product of Anthropic (version Sonnet 4.6), yielded the same as Chat GPT, but added the "right to report without retaliation," some deadlines for reporting, and statute of limitations (the statutory one, not the "two clocks" theory so recently made famous in Florida), and there was discussion of the right to hire an attorney. Claude, likewise, provided no citations for its answers.

Gemini, a Google product, provided detailed medical treatment information, including the "employer choice" of physicians, the entitlements to testing and prescriptions, and even the judicially created medical mileage right. Gemini noted the temporary disability process, the 2026 maximum rate, and the 7-day waiting period. The retaliation preclusion, some critical deadlines, and dispute processes were also noted. The Gemini answer had several hyperlinks to other information (e.g., the Ombudsman Office) and to source information. Some of those were to law firms (one of which I have never heard of before).

Grok is a tool developed by Twitter and owned by SpaceX. Grok led with the duty of timely reporting, overviewed medical with stress on the employer choice, outlined various indemnity categories, and was generally consistent with the quality and quantity of information provided on the other platforms. However, Grok also delved into what businesses must have coverage, attorney fees, and ready contact information for the Employee Assistance Office. It noted that it had consulted "35 sources."

I looked at those sources and found many to be credible, "first-party" sources, including the Florida Legislature, Florida Chief Financial Officer. It also cited some secondary (or tertiary) sources, such as law firm websites.

I asked Grok

"Would your response be different if I asked you to not rely on any commercial websites, specifically no law firms?"

Grok said, "Yes, my response would be somewhat different." I then asked if "the fundamental rights change." It responded with criticalities related to reporting, indemnity, and medical care. The differences included "avoid(ing) phrasing that could imply interpretation from law firm perspectives." It would also avoid "summarized examples" and would emphasize state-provided resources, such as the EAO, brochures, and similar.

Gemini similarly conceded its response "would change." It noted that the "core legal rights ... remain the same," but this directive "changes the tone from a practical summary to a strictly regulatory one." Directed to avoid commercial sites, it would rely on the statute, the Florida Administrative Code, and the Florida Department of Financial Services. This directive would also eliminate "strategy," "advice," or "pro-tips." Gemini noted this would drive it to "no longer point to educational articles written by attorneys." This would "remove() any potential commercial bias or 'sales funnel' language that law firms often use to encourage consultations."

Claude was different. It replied

"No, my response would not be different. The answer I gave you came entirely from my own training knowledge about Florida workers' compensation law — I didn't perform any web searches or consult any law firm websites to generate it."

Claude then added:

"If I had searched the web to answer your question, your request would be a reasonable one to make, and I could limit my sources to official government sources ... (or other non-commercial sources.)".

The lesson is clear. There are differences among the LLM in the marketplace. Some go readily to the internet for information and the risks that entail. Others rely on their training, which itself might as readily have included editorialized, sales, or marketing information in the guise of academic or government production. 

What you glean from your inquiry is influenced by how and what you ask. It may depend for depth or breadth on which LLM you engage. It will be influenced by the currency of information and resources chosen by the LLM for formulating response. The simple fact is that both you and the LLM will likely make choices. Choose well, and check both your work and the results. 

Estes Explains Florida Limitations

The Florida First District Court of Appeal rendered Estes v. Palm Beach County School District on March 23, 2026 (1D2025-0079). The decision may bring rest to the questions that have surrounded section 440.19, Fla. Stat. since the original panel decision in Ortiz v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., 361 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), opinion superseded on reh'g, 402 So. 3d 301 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). Some have found the last three years challenging; others have said confusing.

Some perceived the 2024 withdrawal of that decision as a harbinger for further litigation. The issue was dubbed by some as the "two clocks," and some discussed the existence of contrary authority not mentioned by the original panel decision. The fundamental issue in dispute was the 1993 statutory amendment that first inserted the word "toll" into section 440.19, and the interpretation to be afforded that word.

There are multiple critical points in Estes worth noting.

First, the use of the word "toll" in section 440.19 is afforded specific meaning by the court consistent with the dictionary definition. The March 23, 2026, decision provides significant explanation of both definition and import. 

There is also significant discussion of previous holdings in which the statute of limitations was "extended," as well as explanation of the distinctions between "tolling" and "extension," and the way those words were historically used by various court panels. The majority opinion in Estes also references a similar Florida Supreme Court interpretation of the word "toll" in Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93, 95 n.3 (Fla. 2000), though that was not a workers' compensation case.

Second, the court patently acknowledges that prior decisions have yielded a contrary interpretation of this version of the statute:

"This appeal has been decided en banc because, as discussed below, it corrects our interpretation of § 440.19(2) in a way that directly conflicts with how several previous panels of this court applied the tolling provision in cases such as: Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. Philip, 746 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202, 204, 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Varitimidis v. Walgreen Co./Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Services, Inc., 58 So. 3d 406, 407–08 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Sanchez v. Am. Airlines, 169 So. 3d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). See Fla. R. App. P. 9.331(a) (allowing for en banc hearings if “necessary to maintain uniformity in the court’s decisions”)."

This both reminds the reader of the import of en banc proceedings and illuminates for all that those prior interpretations are impacted by the Estes decision. Clarity is likely appreciated by any reader and is a benefit to those who make daily decisions in this self-executing system of benefits, section 440.015, Fla. Stat. The dissent notably expresses appreciation for that clarity:

"While I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to recede from our precedent, I do appreciate the majority opinion acknowledging the precedent and addressing it directly. En banc consideration “is designed to help the district courts avoid conflict, assure harmonious decisions within the courts’ geographic boundaries, and develop predictability of the law within their jurisdiction. Consistency of decisions within each district is essential to the credibility of the district courts.” Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Schreiber, 479 So. 2d 90, 93 (Fla. 1985)."

Finally, the court notes that it had little knowledge of the breadth of Estes claims. It noted that the parties had stipulated to defer a variety of issues and to proceed to trial on the statute of limitations issue alone ("The only issue teed up by the parties’ stipulation was the E/C’s statute of limitations defense and how § 440.19(2)’s tolling provision applied"). 

This process is called "bifurcation" and simply means some issue(s) will be decided while some other(s) will be postponed for a future trial. The Court noted:

"the scope of this claim hasn’t been fleshed out in the record because the JCC didn’t take evidence or address any substantive claims."

This is not a criticism of the trial judge or parties. It is a recognition that the parties stipulated to defer most of the issues, and thus at least some of the details. This has a cost-saving impact for the parties, as they expend resources only on a specific subset of the overall evidence. They ask the trial judge a narrow question and thus need only invest in that narrow evidence. 

Nonetheless, the Estes court reminded that this leaves the broader dispute(s) for later determination and prevents the court in the bifurcated record from having access to the breadth of issues, claims, and defenses that might be raised as such a claim proceeds in the future. 

Thus, in any dispute, there is perhaps illustration of the benefits of brevity, simplicity, and focus on some singular, critical point, and yet perhaps also some inkling suggested of potential benefits of a fully "fleshed out" record upon which all pending issues were addressed and could be reviewed in context. 

One dissent contends that the bifurcation of issues process "will no longer be available for litigation of (statute of limitations) defenses, among others." This is largely based on the issue of "compensability" as pleaded by Estes and its implications on the finality of trial decisions and appellate jurisdiction. 

This dissent also describes the distinctions between the provisions of section 440.19(5) and the other statutory subsections that use "toll" regarding the workers' compensation statute of limitations. There are interesting distinctions discussed by both the majority and the dissent. 

In the end, the Estes decision is important reading for the workers' compensation community. As an en banc decision, it will bring stability to the subject of the statute of limitations for some time. 

But see the potential for changing interpretations in the almost twenty years encompassed by City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), Matrix Employee Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), and Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), decision quashed sub nom. Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016). 

Meta Citations

A great deal of workers' compensation disputes turn on expert testimony, generally medical in nature. The legislative shift from the Frye standard to the Daubert standard, therefore, is important to those who litigate workers' compensation disputes.

Daubert is not new to these pages; see To D or not to D? that it appears, is the Question (January 2016); Daubert better Explained (May 2016); Daubert, We Hardly Knew Ye, Or do We? (February 2017); Dissing Daubert? (January 2019); Daubert's New Day (May 2019); Daubert in the Courtroom (August 2019).

The Daubert considerations include "reliable foundation," relevance, judgment, and evidence-based medical evidence. One method to demonstrate reliability is the publication of processes, hypotheses, findings, and conclusions in "peer-reviewed journals," which is seen as an indicator of acceptance. This is because we count on the peers who review, and we suspect that there will be critical contrary articles published if the foundations are not solid or if the results are not reproducible.

Some reports suggest there has been a trend toward easing peer review standards and evaluation. This is a review that involves evaluation, but there is no resulting judgment about "the importance or novelty of the research." This is seen as not impacting the Daubert analysis, according to Science and Technology Law Review (February 2018).

However, more recently, there is a process underway called "sneaked references" that bears careful consideration. The Conversation (July 2024) notes the challenges of being a researcher, the importance of publishing, and the emphasis there on citing "the work of peers to provide context," and more. The citation process, particularly a "positive citation by other researchers," enhances visibility and credibility.

Credibility is important. The impact of articles in legal proceedings is important. Publication is noteworthy, but the fact is that in one recent year, "more than 10,000 scientific articles were retracted." This could easily have included articles used by experts in workers' compensation proceedings to support opinions on topics from diagnosis to appropriate care to residual function or disability.

More subtle than the withdrawal problem is that there are methods to manipulate this citation system to "artificially inflate citation counts." Authors do this by "add(ing) extra references" to the paper, but not in the visible text. These extras are added as metadata hidden in the article. Thus, there is the impression created that these meta-citations are real, and the "citation counts" for those articles "have skyrocketed."

This lends undue credit to the expositions, findings, and conclusions of those authors. Though they appear to be garnering reviews and acceptance, they are merely gathering hits from readers who cannot see their work, let alone review it, comment, or critique.

The fact is that this may be meaningless or irrelevant in a given case. Nonetheless, counsel would be well advised to remain curious about the provenance of journal articles that are cited in support of scientific conclusions. Additional questions regarding currency (not withdrawn) and selection or reliance criteria may be warranted. 

In the end, the credibility of an expert's opinions could be questioned. In any credibility dispute, the "what" (opinion) is only half of the necessity. The credible expert can also describe the "how"; as we all learned in grade school, the answer is one thing but showing your work is crucial. 

The Cost of Clothes

It was reported last year that the employees of a company are suing over the company's dress code. I look back over a long working life (I started about 50 years ago), and I have had multiple jobs that required uniforms. I was never given or gifted more than one item (usually a shirt or hat) at any of those jobs, and I worked in several that had dress codes I had to meet out of my own pocket.

This story is likely newsworthy because the employer is well-known: Starbucks. The company has reportedly retreated from a laissez-faire requirement of green aprons with essentially anything else to a more uniform, well, uniform. Employees are upset by the change, and they want the courts to arbitrate their differing perspectives.

The employees are now required to wear a "solid black shirt," collar optional, with "midriff and armpits" covered. Not a huge imposition (one hopes). Each employee was given "two shirts at no cost” but was responsible for their own trousers or an alternative.

A six-pack of reasonable quality black t-shirts runs less than $25.00 (small to double X). If two shirts are a laundry-cycle burden, additional shirts are a reasonably cheap solution.

The trouser requirement is "khaki, black, or blue denim bottoms without patterns or frayed hems or solid black dresses that are not more than 4 inches above the knee." Note that the dress option takes care of the shirt and trousers.

Trousers for women are available for less than $20.00 per pair, and men's for less than $10.00. Some will see this as a reasonably inexpensive requirement. There is likely someone, somewhere, who has no jeans already, but perhaps not many of them? At work or not, people tend to wear pants.

The footwear requirement is no more arduous. The employee can wear "black, gray, dark blue, brown, tan, or white shoes made from a waterproof material."

The article notes an employee who was told she could not wear "Crocs" and "had to go to three stores to find a compliant pair (of shoes) that cost her $60.09." A quick Amazon search found 48 options under $40.00. A Walmart search returned multiple similar options, some as low as $26.00. The Crocs website suggests those comfy slip-ons are similarly priced between $25.00 and $60.00. They are easily cleaned but not waterproof (they have holes in the tops).

The company also will not allow "face tattoos or more than one facial piercing. Tongue piercings and 'theatrical makeup' are also prohibited." Believe it or not, there is a portion of the population (about 66%) that does not find face tattoos appealing. Some people do not care for facial piercings either. I recall a time when any publicly visible tattoos would likely sink an interview in any event.

I ran into a law firm hiring partner several years ago. She expressed shock at the accoutrements one of her attorneys had presented with at work. She noted bluntly that "lawyers don't wear bull rings in their noses" and was otherwise not very complimentary. She wondered aloud why the attorney had not presented that way for the interview.

I similarly once heard a lawyer comment about a restaurant in which many employees are very tattooed. The impression shared was not favorable, to the point of not eating there. Some will see such piercings and decoration as a personal expression; others will view them as representing the business. Whether either is right or wrong, the reality is that perspectives will differ. 

Undoubtedly, there will be those who are attracted to or repulsed by a variety of things. Cracker Barrel recently learned that consumers can react to the decor of a building or even a logo. Why should the decor of the team be immune to such a reaction? I am not a big fan of ties and jackets, but I wear them for proceedings. No employer ever bought me either, but all expected I wear them. 

The Starbucks litigation is interesting. There are broad allegations that the dress code used to be more casual. One case asserts that the old dress code "was also loosely enforced." That is an intriguing proposition in itself. That some prior loose enforcement would matter in a rebranding effort suggests some belief that employees have a property right of some kind in not only the job but the job as they have become accustomed to it; in the rules, but also in the degree of enforcement?

The litigants find the company's dress code "extremely tone deaf," and a requirement that employees "completely redesign their wardrobe." They lament not being allowed "to express (themselves) with colorful shirts and (multiple) facial piercings." One lamented that the workplace "looks sad now that everyone is wearing black." Sad is a matter of perspective; likely, it is much akin to beauty and is in the eye of the beholder?

The lawsuits are proceeding on the basis of "state laws that require companies to reimburse workers for expenses that primarily benefit the employer." One also includes claims under a state law that "prohibits employers from imposing expenses on workers without their written consent." Several have sought reimbursement, including one who "requested $10 for the cost of removing a nose piercing." Ouch. Who knew they could not just be taken off like an earring?

The outcome of the lawsuits will be interesting. There are issues here of corporate identity, uniformity, and customer perceptions. There are arguably issues of safety; footwear in many environments is critical to preventing slips, remaining dry, and stability. But it is, overall, a simple question of whether and when an employer has any modicum of premises or image control, and at what cost (any cost will become an element of your cup of coffee). 

Like workers' compensation, the answers to such questions may depend on state law requirements. California is reputed to be among the most protective, requiring that the employer reimburse "all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee" that are directly related to the work. That is broad enough to perhaps include bus fare, laundering clothes, and more. 

And the outcome of such claims may be influenced by the reasonableness of the cost, the wage level of the jobs, and more. There may be a real distinction between requirements for $4.00 t-shirts and $80 designer jeans. There may be a distinction between those who work for $17.00 to $20.00 minimum wage, and those who earn more.

And, before it is over, the employer may be responsible for paying employees for the time it takes them to change into these clothes, and the expense of cleaning these clothes. 

The expense is an issue that more readily harkens to workers' compensation. The original intention of those laws was that the cost of injury caused by a business should be borne by that business. That pronouncement ignores that, in the end, that expense is borne by the customers of that business. In all, that is not such a bad policy, as it encourages safety and promotes the success of the employer and employee alike. Perhaps that is different from appearance, perhaps not. 

As the socialistic draw of workers' compensation expands, however, and the employer becomes responsible for injury "at work" that is not necessarily caused by or related to work, that expense is likewise borne by the consumer. Similarly, as the expense of uniforms, cleaning, or bus fare becomes the employer's, the logic may be as readily questioned. 

Surveillance Evolution

There is an evolution in America regarding cameras. See Is Privacy Gone? (January 2026) and the various examples cited there. But the so-called Meta Glasses are in the news again, and the evolution is worthy of discussion.

CBS News recently reported that the head of Meta, Mark Zuckerberg, attended a portion of the trial regarding allegations surrounding "the impact of social media on children." The case itself is drawing attention. But some of those who accompanied Mr. Zuckerberg wore "Ray Ban-Meta AI glasses."

There is little context provided, notably how the subject arose, but "The judge upbraided the Meta team." They were told that there could be no recording in the courtroom, and the judge ordered those with the glasses to delete anything that they had already recorded.

There is no First Amendment in courtrooms, according to the Free Speech Center. The American Bar Association (a voluntary trade group comprised of attorneys) purportedly led the ban on "broadcast coverage" of courtroom proceedings following the "circus-like" trial regarding the kidnapping of the Lindbergh child in 1935.

I am not advocating for circuses, though I am a big fan of clowns generally. There is the rational concern that "coverage of the trial" might be "so pervasive that it violates (a defendant's) right to due process." This is yet another example of rights colliding, the individual right to fair trial and the freedom of the press on which many rely for information.

All that said, is a person (or 100) wearing Meta glasses somehow disruptive of a trial? I have conducted hearings with multiple camera tripods in a crowded room. It is not the ideal of safety (hard to evacuate past all that hardware in an emergency), but in my experience, it is not really all that distracting.

What of cellular telephones? In January, Insurance Journal reported that the Workers' Compensation Commission had "banned all communication devices" from trial proceedings there. Notably, the restraint does not apply to "staff, lawyers, court reporters," and more. Furthermore, the presiding commissioner may allow the devices if asked. 

Are cell phones distracting in trial? That is a frequent concern. Many fail to set their devices to "silent." A few have had to be told to decrease volume or mute both in proceedings and in the waiting room before. There is some degree of cluelessness regarding manners and comportment. Might such phones also be used to take pictures or record participants without their knowlege?

What are the broader implications? The New York Times noted in February 2026 that Meta has considered including facial recognition capability in its Ray-Bans. The Verge covered this for those of us who don't subsidize the Times paradigm. The Verge author seemingly implies that no one should be concerned about such a move, basically because facial recognition and government cameras are already ubiquitous. But the counter that Meta, in particular, cannot be trusted is also voiced.

Today, there are people with brain-computer interfaces (BCI) that allow electronic devices to communicate directly with the brain without mouse clicks, keystrokes, or other actions. The Government Accountability Office says these have become more available in the 21st century, and various companies are involved with the technology. However, "fewer than 10 people worldwide have implanted BCI."

Nonetheless, the implications are seemingly clear. The technology is here for minuscule lenses, easily concealed. These can transmit to devices or our own brains. They can connect to the internet for data, and can use databases to access rapid and in-depth information. 

There will be those who fear the potentials and actualities. There will be those who will leverage them to the full extent of the law, and some undoubtedly beyond. Regardless of perspective, it is important to know the implications and possibilities that exist, and how they may affect our interpersonal relations and interactions. 

Cultural Relativism

Cultural relativism was in the news recently with a focus on a financial settlement in some litigation regarding workplace perception and reaction regarding employees who identified with a culture distinct from the one in which they were working. The term "cultural relativism" was familiar, but not one I had visited recently.

The concept is central to much of anthropological study. It has been " long a key concept in anthropology." An interesting article in the Chronicle of Higher Education notes this history, but some see a diminution in anthropological interest in recent decades. And the author in that contra suggests some relation or association between cultural relativism and moral relativism.

Cultural relativism is

"The view that attitudes, behaviors, values, concepts, and achievements must be understood in the light of their own cultural milieu and not judged according to the standards of a different culture."

Moral relativism is

"The belief that the morality or immorality of an action is determined by social custom rather than by universal or fixed standards of right and wrong."

The critical distinction is "cultural milieu" versus "social custom." The "relativism" is a constant. There is room there to consider the view of St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE), "an unjust law is no law at all." 

Either relativism is the conclusion that right and wrong are both flexible and self-centered. Whether it is someone's cultural posture or their personal customs, it is the person alone who defines right and wrong. In the St. Augustine spirit, is an undefined or undefinable law fatally flawed?

The recent news report originated with the British Broadcasting Corporation, which has had some credibility issues, and was republished by Yahoo News. The article explains how microwaving food led to friction, perceptions, and a lawsuit.

A staff member complained when an Indian dish was reheated, "because of the way it smelled." The employee heating the dish alleged that the complaint and the employer's response were effectively "discriminating against Indians for their 'Indianness.'" While this was not a major news story in America, it "received significant media coverage in India" and Britain. The BBC referred to this as "what many have described as 'food racism.'"

This is intriguing because Indians complain of such "racism" while in Western nations, but others allege "discrimination over food is rampant in India as well." The BBC contends that this is not country- or region-centric, with complaints of "food habit" "shaming" reported in various corners of the world.

After complaining about the criticism regarding his food, the employee alleged "a series of actions by the" employer, including loss of work status and position, responsibilities, and supervisory relationships. The employee alleged workplace discrimination in a lawsuit, and the employer settled. The BBC suggests such resolutions are not uncommon, in avoidance of expense and risk of litigation.

Interestingly, the employer was a university, and the situation arose in its Anthropology Department. The employee's significant other was also an instructor and invited the food-microwaver to speak to a class, focusing on "Cultural relativism," which the BBC defines as "the view that no culture is superior or inferior to another as cultural practices of all groups exist within their own cultural context."

This was translated into the plaintiff's allegation that despite skills and knowledge, "the system is constantly telling you that because of your skin colour or your nationality, you can be sent back any time." This is perceived by her as being employed in a precarious and uncertain posture.

There are various questions to unpack. First is whether relativism is the appropriate standard, whether cultural or moral. Should the workplace or society be governed by singular standards that apply universally, or should the cultural or moral perspectives of various people lead to various standards (or, in effect, no standards at all)?

Second, in the event there would be singular standards, who would define them, would exceptions be debated, and why? Is there any relevance in the advice of Saint Ambrose of Milan (c339-397): "When in Rome, do as the Romans do?" Or is it more logical for the Romans to adjust to accommodate the perceptions of their guests? 

In the balancing of rights, do the wishes of a person wanting to create a smell automatically outweigh the wishes of a person who does not wish to experience it? Which person's cultural or moral perspective should control the outcome of whether the smell creation is allowed and/or protected?

Does it matter in this analysis whether either the need or the objection is based on health, safety, or welfare, that is, something beyond preference of comfort? Can one passenger on a plane object to what others eat? Does it matter if the objector is concerned for their own reaction to their fellow passenger's peanuts or is concerned that someone the objector might later contact could have a reaction? How direct or tenuous is appropriate? Based on whose perspective, culture, or morals?

There is always challenges in balancing the rights of various people or groups. See Rights Collide (February 2016); Where do we go from here? (March 2016); What is Right with Comp? (June 2016); Free Speech and Due Process (June 2022). As we provide balance, there will be questions of perspective, society, individuals, and, it appears, relativism. This is intriguing.

The ultimate issue will be no different than other balancing questions. May I be as offended by someone's cannibalism as they are by my politely declining to partake?

Luke 14:5

I have no illusions of becoming the student of scripture that so many around me were in my youth. My grandmother could quote the Good Book with the best of them. Sometimes her references confused me, and at others, she nailed it.

I recall an intriguing exchange eons ago that involved a chest freezer, a rented trailer with a malfunctioning tongue jack, a less-than-capable hand truck, and a collapsing porch. The story would require days to recount in a meaningful way, but suffice it to say the supervisor on the job was Murphy, and his impactful law was decisive.

Through a series of challenges, I found myself still striving to load a trailer on Sunday morning, a task that should have easily concluded Saturday before supper ("dinner" is consumed at noon in the South, and the evening repast is known as "supper"). Nonetheless, I was lecturing the freezer and trailer in a colorful monologue that Sunday morning, late enough that the dinner hour approached.

A car pulled up the gravel drive; it was none other than the local Baptist minister. One of my great-grandfathers was a founder of the local Baptist church, two miles to the west, while another of my great-grandfathers was a founder of the local Methodist church, two miles to the East. 

Each was on the same road as the house at which I labored that morning. As a child, my father walked dutifully to one church each Sunday before supper and to the other each Sunday after dinner. That's a different story, but suffice it to say, stopping was convenient, and it is fair to say my grandmother got her love of scripture honestly.

Back to my three-hundred-pound freezer, rickety hand truck, hundred-year-old front porch and stairs, soft yard ... Yeah, "careful" never occurred to me. Thanks for mentioning it, Grandma.

It is amazing how much speed a three-hundred-pound load can accumulate over a very short distance. The hand truck ended up embedded in the yard, and upon excavation was significantly cattywompus from a bent axle. It was an adventure. 

Back to the minister. As he alighted from his truck (yes, 'tis the south), my grandmother greeted him with an excuse for her absence from the morning service with a reference to Luke 14:5: 

"my ox is in the pit." 

The Gospel itself says:

"Then He answered them, saying, 'Which of you, having a donkey or an ox that has fallen into a pit, will not immediately pull him out on the Sabbath day?'”

The connotation is that we must meet our obligations. There is a call to worship expressed in those teachings, but there are also sound excuses for not observing the Sabbath.

All that makes sense. But the minister's response has stuck with me for decades. He replied:

"That's no excuse if you pushed the ox into the ditch." ("pit" or "ditch" depends on which translation you are reading).

That struck me immediately. How would this late-arrival observer be in any position to decide how the ox got in the ditch? It seemed presumptuous and rude. Where did he get off jumping to the conclusion that the current moment was somehow a fault or failure of intent, plan, or process?

I do not recall sharing my thoughts with him, but my mind was awash with sarcasm and repudiation. Despite his assumption and accusatory tone, he sat in the yard and conversed with my grandmother for a long while; I had the trailer loaded by the time he elected to move on with his day. As I recall, he did not offer to help me with that freezer at any point.

Nonetheless, the story has lessons. 

There is merit in preparation. So often, in the world of litigation, we see those who have failed a deadline. Their trial is imminent, their deadline nigh, and they are not ready. In the context of this post, their ox is in the ditch. While they may struggle to pull it out, they may also seek excuse from the existing mandate, the trial. This is the motion for continuance, post-hearing discovery, and the like.

Much like the esteemed minister so long ago, the judge's job is to ask the simple question, "How did the ox get in the pit?" That it is will be part of the analysis; there is a need for relief. But the statute in Florida workers' compensation seeks an analysis of why, "the reason for requesting the continuance arises from circumstances beyond the party’s control." Section 440.25(1), Fla. Stat.

Did you push your own ox into the ditch? Were you inattentive to your flock and the ox was allowed to wander into the ditch? Can you explain how the ox being in the ditch is beyond your control? If you can, then you should be able to expect the judge to get up and help you with extracting it. 

If you cannot explain it, much as they may commisserate and sympathize, they are likely to partake of the conversation and then be on their way. Be direct, sincere, and frank. Tell the whole story, the unexpected weight, the impaired trailer, the malfunctioning hand cart, and the efforts you have endured striving to overcome them all. 

You don't have to be Hemingway, Faulkner, or Shakespeare, but you must be able to tell a story. Do it well, and your chances of relief increase markedly.