The Florida First District Court of Appeal rendered Estes v. Palm Beach County School District on March 23, 2026 (1D2025-0079). The decision may bring rest to the questions that have surrounded section 440.19, Fla. Stat. since the original panel decision in Ortiz v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., 361 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), opinion superseded on reh'g, 402 So. 3d 301 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). Some have found the last three years challenging; others have said confusing.
Some perceived the 2024 withdrawal of that decision as a harbinger for further litigation. The issue was dubbed by some as the "two clocks," and some discussed the existence of contrary authority not mentioned by the original panel decision. The fundamental issue in dispute was the 1993 statutory amendment that first inserted the word "toll" into section 440.19, and the interpretation to be afforded that word.
There are multiple critical points in Estes worth noting.
First, the use of the word "toll" in section 440.19 is afforded specific meaning by the court consistent with the dictionary definition. The March 23, 2026, decision provides significant explanation of both definition and import.
There is also significant discussion of previous holdings in which the statute of limitations was "extended," as well as explanation of the distinctions between "tolling" and "extension," and the way those words were historically used by various court panels. The majority opinion in Estes also references a similar Florida Supreme Court interpretation of the word "toll" in Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93, 95 n.3 (Fla. 2000), though that was not a workers' compensation case.
Second, the court patently acknowledges that prior decisions have yielded a contrary interpretation of this version of the statute:
"This appeal has been decided en banc because, as discussed below, it corrects our interpretation of § 440.19(2) in a way that directly conflicts with how several previous panels of this court applied the tolling provision in cases such as: Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. Philip, 746 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202, 204, 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Varitimidis v. Walgreen Co./Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Services, Inc., 58 So. 3d 406, 407–08 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Sanchez v. Am. Airlines, 169 So. 3d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). See Fla. R. App. P. 9.331(a) (allowing for en banc hearings if “necessary to maintain uniformity in the court’s decisions”)."
This both reminds the reader of the import of en banc proceedings and illuminates for all that those prior interpretations are impacted by the Estes decision. Clarity is likely appreciated by any reader and is a benefit to those who make daily decisions in this self-executing system of benefits, section 440.015, Fla. Stat. The dissent notably expresses appreciation for that clarity:
"While I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to recede from our precedent, I do appreciate the majority opinion acknowledging the precedent and addressing it directly. En banc consideration “is designed to help the district courts avoid conflict, assure harmonious decisions within the courts’ geographic boundaries, and develop predictability of the law within their jurisdiction. Consistency of decisions within each district is essential to the credibility of the district courts.” Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Schreiber, 479 So. 2d 90, 93 (Fla. 1985)."
Finally, the court notes that it had little knowledge of the breadth of Estes claims. It noted that the parties had stipulated to defer a variety of issues and to proceed to trial on the statute of limitations issue alone ("The only issue teed up by the parties’ stipulation was the E/C’s statute of limitations defense and how § 440.19(2)’s tolling provision applied").
This process is called "bifurcation" and simply means some issue(s) will be decided while some other(s) will be postponed for a future trial. The Court noted:
"the scope of this claim hasn’t been fleshed out in the record because the JCC didn’t take evidence or address any substantive claims."
This is not a criticism of the trial judge or parties. It is a recognition that the parties stipulated to defer most of the issues, and thus at least some of the details. This has a cost-saving impact for the parties, as they expend resources only on a specific subset of the overall evidence. They ask the trial judge a narrow question and thus need only invest in that narrow evidence.
Nonetheless, the Estes court reminded that this leaves the broader dispute(s) for later determination and prevents the court in the bifurcated record from having access to the breadth of issues, claims, and defenses that might be raised as such a claim proceeds in the future.
Thus, in any dispute, there is perhaps illustration of the benefits of brevity, simplicity, and focus on some singular, critical point, and yet perhaps also some inkling suggested of potential benefits of a fully "fleshed out" record upon which all pending issues were addressed and could be reviewed in context.
One dissent contends that the bifurcation of issues process "will no longer be available for litigation of (statute of limitations) defenses, among others." This is largely based on the issue of "compensability" as pleaded by Estes and its implications on the finality of trial decisions and appellate jurisdiction.
This dissent also describes the distinctions between the provisions of section 440.19(5) and the other statutory subsections that use "toll" regarding the workers' compensation statute of limitations. There are interesting distinctions discussed by both the majority and the dissent.
In the end, the Estes decision is important reading for the workers' compensation community. As an en banc decision, it will bring stability to the subject of the statute of limitations for some time.
But see the potential for changing interpretations in the almost twenty years encompassed by City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), Matrix Employee Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), and Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), decision quashed sub nom. Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016).
