Lefty Gomez is credited with the quote "I'd rather be lucky than good." I have heard that stated a number of ways over the years, and it has a ring to it. This "new Miranda warning" is for judges, and is a reminder that luck is possible. But, despite luck being a possibility, the warning part is that one perhaps really should not count on it.
In this instance, Miranda is not a high-profile Supreme Court analysis regarding the delivery of warnings to people in police custody. The Hollywood influence has made that one so memorable for us all, repeated over and over again. This Miranda is "Shandaken Town Justice Michael Miranda." Shandaken is a town in New York, and Judge Miranda was lucky enough to take a break from New York and visit Florida back in 2018.
According to the Defense Maven, Judge Miranda spent March 18, 2018 in "a hard night of drinking in Orlando, Florida." He then went to the airport where he "downed at least eight vodka drinks between the time he arrived at the airport for his 11 a.m. flight" and his arrival in New York. While driving seventy miles from the airport to Shandaken, he apparently "pulled off at a rest area and downed some more vodka." We often discuss the attribute of judicial consistency; this is not what we are talking about.
After successfully navigating the two airports and miles of driving, Judge Miranda's luck ran out somewhat when he eventually arrived in Shandaken around 5:30 p.m. According to the Defense Maven, upon arrival, he "promptly slammed his Subaru into two benches and a couple of stop signs," causing "nearly $7,000 in damage to his vehicle, but didn’t injure himself or anyone else." It is fortunate when a drunk driver avoids hurting or killing someone.
Accidents tend to attract law enforcement, and that was where Judge Miranda's luck might seem to end. Apparently, when the police arrived, "the judge was exhibiting signs of intoxication" and the state police were called (in recognition of the potential for conflict of interest of the local police). One news source reported that Judge Miranda then lied to the police, claiming he had consumed only two beers earlier in the day. Contrary to that alleged assertion, the news stories seem consistent in describing his penchant for vodka.
According to the Daily Freeman, Judge Miranda underwent "a chemical breath test that showed a blood-alcohol content of 0.17 percent." That alcohol presence is "more than twice the state's 0.8 percent threshold for drunken driving." The New York Post reported that the results were "three times the legal limit." Despite the evidence of impaired driving, "he pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of driving while ability impaired, a traffic infraction, and paid a $300 fine and a $260 surcharge." Some might say that while his luck seemed to end when he wrecked the car, it did not end completely.
As an aside, one might wonder how many New York citizens who test at twice the presumptive impairment level are given the opportunity to plead instead to a "traffic infraction" and pay a fine. Some resources suggest driving under the influence in New York can come with significant penalties. There is support on that website and others with a blood alcohol result in excess of 0.16 may be labeled "aggravated DUI," for which penalties are said to be more significant still. It appears that some people might get in serious trouble for such behavior.
Those are legal issues. In the instance of such infractions or charges, the judge is no different than any other driver, and hardly the subject of a blog post on workers' compensation (I hear you, "What does this have to do with workers' compensation?").
The relevance here comes from the accused's alleged statements as a judge. During the course of the state police investigation, it is alleged that Judge Miranda invoked his occupation as somehow relevant to his crash-scene situation. It is alleged that he confronted the police and "demanded to know whether or not the troopers realized who he was," according to one story. ("I'm a judge" is almost never an appropriate defense to anything). It is also alleged that he threatened the state police, vowing "to never handle arraignments for the NYSP again."
The judge later found himself before the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct. In February 2020, the Commission concluded Judge Miranda should be "should be censured for the consequences of excessive drinking and driving." The Commission found relevant his drinking, the risk at which he had placed others, and his "false statements to the police." Judges that lie are an interesting problem. It also noted his "asserting his judicial office" ("I'm a judge"). The Commission concluded his actions were serious enough to come “very close to removal.” There is a statement in its decision that the Commission "would have suspended the judge from office without pay if that sanction were available, which under the law it is not."
And, the Commission Administrator stressed that Judge Miranda did not "follow through on his threat" against the State Police (in some places, making a threat itself is sanctionable). The published decision does not provide details regarding New York law or its Code of Judicial Conduct. The distinction between making judicial threats and following through on them is not clear from the opinion. The Commissioner Administrator's comments suggest that in New York judicial threats regarding bias or dereliction are only actionable if carried out. There is similarly no further discussion of the law regarding the "asserting his judicial office" allegation.
It is interesting that this judge was able to evade prosecution for driving under the influence. It is as interesting, or more, that the Commission on Judicial Conduct settled on censure ("an official reprimand," see Merriam Webster online). The conduct described, "asserting his judicial office" was serious. The act of making "false statements to the police" was significant. The act of threatening the state police with his position as a judge is critical. Some would say it remains serious as a threat even if not acted upon later.
It is possible that mitigation might be discerned in such a situation. The news reported his testimony included an admission "that he has struggled with alcohol abuse for over 10 years." Furthermore, that he voluntarily "entered a two-week inpatient treatment program after his arrest," followed by periodic sessions with a counselor. The Commission found relevance in their conclusion that he was a first-time offender and a veteran.
The New York Post refers to the censure as "a slap-on-the-wrist penalty that allows him to stay on the bench." Thus, the integrity of the entire judicial system is impugned in the press. The perceptions of the public regarding the judicial system there are perhaps therefore also not positive. The inappropriate actions of one judge, condoned by a system, and paraded in the press affect the perceptions of the public.
The Judge's decisions and actions do not "uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary," Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 ("A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved."). Lying to police, threatening police, and asserting the judicial office does not seemingly comport with this Canon. I quote the Florida Code for illustration as it is most familiar to me. The American Bar Association Model Code is similar (a recommendation of a private industry group).
The Judge's decisions and actions do not "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities," Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 ("A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary"). Driving significantly under the influence, lying to police, threatening police, and asserting the judicial office also do not seemingly comport with this Canon.
The Judge's decisions and actions do not facilitate the performance of "the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently," Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 ("A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity"). The actions described in the news and the Commission report seemingly do not indicate dignity, courtesy, or professional demeanor as regards the police with whom he interacted.
The new Miranda warning is for all judges. However, this judge was fortunate to only come “very close to removal.” This judge was lucky, apparently, to deal with a forgiving and lackadaisical justice system and an equally forgiving state commission. From the outside looking in, it seems practical for judges to ponder that the outcome from such behavior might well be otherwise in various other jurisdictions. While New York condones such behavior, it is practical to hope that other jurisdictions might not.
