There will be lively discussion today at the Workers' Compensation Forum. I am honored to be on a panel led by Ya'Sheaka Williams, Esq. and including Gloria Garcia, Esq., and Hon. Jacqueline Newman. They call it "Current Trends," and it is always interesting.
One of my foci this morning will be "First Principles" as recently discussed by the Sixth District Court of Appeal in Ruffenach v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. as Tr. for Ameriquest Mortg. Sec. Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-R8, No. 6D2023-1482, 2026 WL 785140 (Fla. 6th DCA Mar. 20, 2026).
At first blush, the workers' compensation community should first say "what does the 6th have to do with us?" or even "this is not a comp case." Both would be apt. Both might be a bit short of the mark.
The court notes that there is some perception that various District Courts have wandered over the years. It notes this regarding the perceived need for attorney fee hearings. The court makes the point that an old workers' compensation case from the Florida Supreme Court suggested a hearingless procedure long ago. Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1987). I have cited it often.
The Sixth District certifies that it disagrees with the decisions of the other five Districts, 37 such decisions. That is an amazing outcome. This new District Court has concluded that these others have been misguided many times. And it suggests that an old workers' compensation case is a great guide forward for the law regarding how attorney fees are determined.
To do so, the court draws back to "First Principles." This is not an attack on the idea of stare decisis, though some perceive it as such. It is a return to the fundamental process of examining the law, be it statute, rule, etc., that lies at the foundation of prior court decisions. It is not that we cannot follow precedent but that we must question the foundations of such decisional law.
Having done so, the Sixth District concludes that
"Sixty-two years ago, the Second District invented a requirement for trial courts to receive expert testimony before granting an award of attorneys’ fees."
"Invented" may be a bit strong? Nonetheless, having so concluded, the Sixth departed from layers of precedent and made a decision based on the law or the absence of it. The court thus departs from long-established decisional law that has heretofore been consistent across the state.
In this, some in the workers' compensation community may see some parallel to Estes v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1D2025-0079, 2026 WL 796496 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 23, 2026). There, the First District concluded:
"Our duty, however, is to faithfully apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the enacted text."
In doing so, the First District receded from several of its own cases interpreting the section 440.19 statute of limitations. It did so openly. It said that when there is an issue as to the efficacy of the foundation in prior decisions, then
“[t]he proper question becomes whether there is a valid reason why not to recede from that precedent.”
The Estes decision does not mention First Principles, but the logic may seem similar to some observers.
What decisional law in Florida workers' compensation might be subject to such arguments? There are several that jump to mind:
- Why does the evidence code apply in workers' compensation?
- Why are repetitive trauma injuries considered under an accident/disease hybrid?
- Why can an issue be barred if claims for it are dismissed voluntarily twice?
- Why must a worker show an exceptional exertion to demonstrate the compensability of a heart attack?
- Why are statutory provisions of "arising out of" subject to interpretation?
- Why is medical mileage a benefit in Florida workers' compensation?
These are discussion points. There are appellate decisions on each. They are perhaps interesting, and some would suggest that other corners of the law might be as readily discussed. The point is that Judges of Compensation Claims are bound to follow precedent. Nonetheless, there is some potential that appellate courts will elect not to, either in rejecting the logic of their peers or revisiting their own decisions.
Nonetheless, there is some likelihood that litigants will increasingly raise arguments that contradict prior precedent. They will perhaps strive to see the law change in their circumstance based on a new look at the underlying statute or rule. That is advocacy and is the root of effective lawyering.
It is an intriguing time to be in this practice and to hear the perspectives of the many intellectual and engaged professionals that inhabit this space.
