An interesting headline in May caught my attention. It is hard to tell what an “indeterminate leave of absence” is. That is an odd statement in any employment setting, generally, but more so for a judge. That first story was short on facts as to why, but provided guidance on how the community would be served in the meantime.
The story detailed that the judge was admitted to The Florida Bar in 2009 and “gained election to the Circuit Court in 2020, running unopposed." According to The Florida Bar, she earned her Jurisprudence Doctor from Barry University School of Law. My first thought of "indeterminate" was illness (I'm old), but her relative youth made that seem less likely. When you reach my age, it seems that peers are dying with increasing frequency. But I digress.
The reported matter remained a curiosity. About a month later, a June 2025 headline noted that the judge had resigned from the $196,898-per-year job. The resignation was submitted (dated April 29), which essentially created a three-month paid absence, as it was effective July 1, 2025. I suspect there are challenges in any transition between vocations.
That second story detailed a writ of prohibition proceeding and various orders of the Florida 6th DCA in the fall of 2024. Though the news report seems to suggest a potential connection to the resignation, that is conjecture. The report regarding the Sixth DCA is nonetheless worthy of discussion.
For more on extraordinary writs, see A Law Student and a Series of Dumb Mistakes (May 2018). These writs are fundamentally tools for asking a court to affect some other court, elected official, or agency's process, action, or inaction.
That writ focused on a custody case with troubling facts. A mother “traveled to an apartment (with her infant daughter and a toddler son) … in a car containing drugs and guns.” The mother and her boyfriend “knew (this) was unsafe because they had been warned they would be killed if they went there.”
That ended in tragedy; a shootout resulted, and the toddler died in his car seat. One must feel sorrow for the toddler, and the impact on his infant sister is profound. Custody of the infant was given to her father, and the mother sought to change that, to regain custody, in proceedings before the now-resigned judge. The state instead sought an “involuntary petition for termination of parental rights.”
Death, drugs, weapons, shootings—there is plenty in the reporting to trouble the reader.
Nonetheless, ten or more issues here are of interest to all judges.
First, the judge told the parties, “She wanted to discuss a case plan instead of setting a hearing on (the) termination of parental rights.” A decision-maker holding “conferences” is curious to some. They see adjudicators instead as hearing arguments and making decisions. There are undoubtedly times when some conference is of use, but motions are worthy of hearing and decisions.
Second, the judge later voiced settlement suggestions: “I’m still confused as to why you haven’t made any kind of offer to this woman.” The decisions of settlement offers and responses are the parties' and should be of no moment to an adjudicator. Such statements can be seen as coercive and inappropriate. Then, disregarding the termination petition, the judge heard the mother’s motion to modify custody to return the infant.
Third, a legal constraint, a statute requiring a “home study” in custody determinations, was raised. The judge adjourned so the mother’s counsel could research. Such a delay is common and consistent with both due process and deciding cases on their merits. But, the judge also allegedly suggested to the mother that a motion to dismiss, if filed, would be heard when the case reconvened. Some might see that as the umpire departing the objective arbiter role to be a coach?
Fourth, “the next day,” a motion to dismiss was heard over the state’s objection. The judge allegedly commented on the case, saying to the state:
“ it does not look like a great case for you guys.”“ I’m just not seeing it. I don’t know how you are going to get there.”“ it bothers me that she is still away from her child.”“I can’t see a path to a victory for you.”
Reaching conclusions and making decisions should be a task undertaken after the evidence and argument is heard (fifth?).
After the hearing, the judge did not dismiss but modified the custody and ordered the infant returned to the mother. Such decisions have to be difficult; weighing a child's best interest must be excruciating.
Sixth, the state sought to renew its objection because the statute requires a “home study.” Acknowledging the law, the judge reportedly said:
“And you know what I said? I said appeal it. I’m going to do it anyway because it’s wrong. It’s just wrong. And I’m just not going to abide by it. I get that statute says that. I fully understand it. But what is right to be done here is to return this child to her mother.”
Judges have a duty to follow the law. That said, a law can be subject to review by courts. They might be unconstitutional, conflict with other statutes, or otherwise require study and consideration. But "it's just wrong" is not seemingly at that level.
Seventh, the state sought to disqualify the judge, alleging
“the judge’s statements demonstrat(e) she had pre-judged the evidence and that she would not abide by controlling statutes,”
The judge denied the motion, and the state petitioned the 6th DCA for the prohibition. That court "stayed" the trial proceedings. That is a court order that means “stop.” When the court or tribunal above you says "stop," what do you do?" Emeline sings “And I'm like, ‘Oh my god, just stop’" (Everything I’m not, 2023). Good advice—when the court says "stop," then "Oh my god, just stop."
For whatever reason, the trial judge did not stop. The judge “the same day … entered an order striking … witnesses.” (Eighth?).
The next day, the judge “convened an evidentiary hearing … (on the mother’s motion) to further strike … witnesses.” The state objected, but proceedings persisted." (Ninth?)
The story says that “the judge interrogated DCF (the state's lawyer) counsel for almost an hour about DCF’s investigation of the case and preparation of its witnesses for trial, allowing Y.B.’s (the mother's) counsel to freely interject comments on DCF’s answers.” Judges are listeners, adjudicators, not inquisitors. See Sleuthing Addressed Again (January 2018)(Tenth?).
Judges should maintain order in any hearing, which is not usually "allowing ... to freely interject." This extended beyond the judge taking a side noted above, as it looks like the mother's attorney and the judge ganged up on the opposing party (DCF)(Eleventh?)
There are many reasons to question counsel. Was a document filed? When was some fact known or disclosed? Was a document served? What efforts were made to produce the witness here? How do I spell that? And many more.
However, beyond questioning counsel, reportedly, “The judge also called one of DCF’s trial witnesses to the witness stand, placed her under oath, and conducted her own examination of the witness.” (Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth? at least)
With significant speed,
“the Sixth DCA on Nov. 13 granted the petition, disqualifying (the judge) from any further proceedings in the case and quashing all orders she had entered after the show cause order.”
The DCA noted judicial comments regarding prejudging and the statute. It also noted a “knowing violation of this Court’s stay.”
These ten or more lessons are reasonably patent. Judges are not advocates. Lawyers advocate; mediators facilitate; judges decide. Judges follow the law. Although that may be challenging when statutes and appellate decisions conflict, no conflict was noted here. Judges follow orders from appellate courts.
As Train put it, we obey the appellate court “even when I know you’re wrong” (Drops of Jupiter, Columbia 2001). The review and correction of appellate decisions are for other appellate courts, legislatures, and others. It is not relevant whether the trial judge finds appellate decisions correct or not. They are the law. The role of a trial judge is not to ignore what appellate courts say.
I’ve noted Paul Harvey frequently. It is possible there is more to this story. Nonetheless, there are multiple concerns worth every judge's consideration. Remain impartial; this is not your case. Follow the law; you weren’t elected or appointed to make law. Obey the appellate court; they are doing their job, so do yours.
A judge inclined to coach, interrogate, collaborate with a party, coax (coerce?) a settlement, or ignore statutes or appellate courts might simply think of Emeline. On the topic of agreeing with appellate decisions, perhaps simply, instead, just think of Train. There is much to consider in the reported facts, and there may be some Paul Harvey out there. But in the end, some reasonably simple conclusions. Remember Emeline ("just stop"), Train (“even when"), and their sound lyrical advice.
