Increased Discipline

The Florida Supreme Court entered an interesting order on May 15, 2025, in No. SC2023-0869, The Florida Bar v. Ryan Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell is a 2007 graduate of the University of Detroit Mercy School of Law and was admitted to The Florida Bar in 2009. 

The disciplinary proceedings followed his "plea of no contest to two criminal misdemeanors for physically assaulting his wife and throwing her cellphone into a pool." The case is interesting because of the punishment delivered by the Court and the procedural process that led to it. 

The attorney was involved in an altercation with his spouse in 2021. While "three minor children were in the home," a "physical altercation" ended with the spouse "sustain(ing) significant injuries, including a fractured nose and a black eye." The spouse's cell phone was also deposited in the pool, and the attorney departed "before law enforcement arrived."   

The altercation details are, unfortunately, too common. Healthline reports that domestic violence is significant. The determination of how significant is frustrated by "various systemic, legal, social, and emotional roadblocks to reporting." Despite this, they conclude, "domestic violence affects approximately 10 million people in the United States each year." That is a great many. 

The criminal court in this instance withheld adjudication and imposed probation that included education, "mental health evaluation," and "drug and alcohol evaluation," among other conditions. The Florida Bar instigated disciplinary proceedings, and a referee recommended a finding of guilt:

"of violating rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor  Misconduct) and 4-8.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”)"

The referee noted that as of 2023, the attorney "was in full compliance with his misdemeanor probation," and recommended that the Court publicly reprimand the attorney and require "private therapy until the end of the criminal probation." 

The Florida attorney discipline system is under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Thus, the Bar investigates and makes decisions about charging, a referee, usually a Circuit Judge, conducts hearings and makes recommendations, and ultimately, the Court makes decisions as to guilt and punishment.  

The Florida Bar did not agree with the referee recommendation and sought "a 90-day suspension followed by one year of probation and participation in a FLA, Inc. contract." That is Florida Lawyer's Assistance, Inc. I have known many lawyers to benefit from contact with that group. Their focus began with alcohol issues, but their team can be helpful with anything from stress to addiction. 

The Supreme Court, in this instance, did not agree with either the referee (reprimand) or the Bar (90 days). It noted that it is not bound by a recommended punishment, and that it is the Court's ultimate "responsibility to order the appropriate sanction." It noted that a public reprimand is appropriate in specific instances, but "is not applicable here" based on some specific definitions and "Standard 5.1(c)."  

The Bar has adopted Florida's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which is "An amended version of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions." The Court cited the ABA standards in The Fla. Bar v. Hosner, 513 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 1987), but in 1988 cited instead "to Florida's Standards for Imposing Lawyer sanctions," The Fla. Bar v. Newhouse, 520 So. 2d 25, 26 (Fla. 1988). 

Thus, those standards are long-standing, almost 40 years old. There are hundreds of citations to the Florida Standards since. The preface to the Standards notes their adoption and that "The Florida Bar will use," though leaving discretion to the Court. Perhaps it was that directive language that led the Bar to disagree with the referee here. 

It is likely that, despite reading many attorney discipline decisions, most lawyers are unaware of the Standards and how they might influence, guide, or constrain attorney discipline. They are not mentioned in the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, Section 3, Rules of Discipline. Nonetheless, the Standards are published on the Bar website in downloadable pamphlet form (50 pages approx.). 

In arriving at its ultimate conclusions in the present case, the Court discussed both aggravating and mitigating factors found by the referee. 

The Court noted that one mitigating factor relied on  by the referee, the payment of over $2,000 in medical bills, was "only after he was ordered to do so as a condition of his probation." Mitigation is voluntary action(s), not court-ordered actions. Furthermore, in any estimation, $2,000 is significant. The Court also noted that the mitigation overall in this case was insufficient to justify "a downward adjustment" in punishment. 

Despite the " significant showing in mitigation," the Court concluded that the "choice to commit a violent criminal act - especially one directed against his spouse" was "significant" and "cannot be sufficiently addressed through a public reprimand or tolerated in the legal profession." The decision does not seem to focus on the presence of the minor children, but one wonders about the effect this interaction had on those three lives. 

After a brief discussion of precedent, the Court imposed "a two-year rehabilitative suspension." Justice Canady dissented in part. He noted that the appropriate suspension would be "three years rather than two years." The pertinence of this decision for all lawyers is worthy of review.

1. Criminal activity is troublesome in professional and personal life. 
2. Mitigation is voluntary, not merely obeying court orders. In this vein, one might say that restitution is mitigation but not a cure.  
3. Ultimately, the Court is responsible for determining an appropriate sanction. 

This instance is worth reading. It provides insight into the Standards and their potential impact. It is a reminder that criminal activity is a broad category, well beyond the constraints of the lawyer's practice, professionalism, and capability. The rules constrain lawyer activity on a 24/7/365 basis, which is perhaps sobering. Some might say onerous. 

Finally, the decision is interesting in its distinctions on punishment. The referee recommended only illumination and embarrassment by reprimand. The Bar sought a 90-day suspension, and the Court imposed two years. Here, there is also a reminder of the importance of 90 days. The Standards, 2.2, remind:

Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a specified minimum period of time. A suspension of 90 days or less does not require proof of rehabilitation. A suspension of more than 90 days requires proof of rehabilitation and may require passage of all or part of the bar examination. No suspension is ordered for a specific period of time in excess of 3 years. (Emphasis added). 

Thus, if imposed, the Bar recommendation of 90 days would have rendered the attorney eligible for readmission with no burden of proving anything beyond the passage of 90 days. The suspension for more than 90 days "requires proof of rehabilitation" and perhaps more. Any future readmission to The Florida Bar will likely involve a petition, hearing, and Court action. 

The imposition of such a significant sanction signals the perception of severity about such a situation, and the seriousness of a physical attack that caused such significant personal injury. 

There is much to ponder here indeed.