The Connecticut appellate court recently rendered its decision in Arrico v. Board of Education, AC 44409 and AC 44488, on appeal from the Workers' Compensation Review Board. Notably, the first line of appeal there is a specialized workers' compensation board, similarly to Kentucky, see Is there a Doctor in the House (June 2022). The trial judge there is referred to as a Commissioner.
The issue at trial in Arrico was total disability benefits. The employer/carrier contended that the worker had reached maximum medical improvement and "had a work capacity." There were two work accidents, and after each, the parties entered into "two voluntary agreements" which "were approved." The trial judge (Commissioner) ruled in favor of the employer/carrier and the injured worker sought relief from the Board, claiming "the commissioner applied an improper standard in determining that his current disability was the result of preexisting, noncompensable injuries."
Notably, the Board "concluded that the" trial judge's (commissioner’s) ruling was not based on competent evidence, but upon ‘‘conjecture, speculation(,) or surmise.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) It noted that the judge had accepted one doctor's opinion rendered in 2008 while rejecting another's rendered in 2017 on the basis that the 2008 opinion came from "a treating physician." While such a conclusion may have merit, if appropriately explained by the trial judge, the Board noted that such an acceptance is appropriate only if both opinions or examinations are "contemporaneous with the compensable injuries at issue." Furthermore, the credibility conclusions must be "explained in detail."
The Court noted that the Board's decision "cited decisions in which trial commissioners had resolved similar claims," and presumably resolved similar disagreements in testimony and other evidence. However, the Court noted that
‘‘[i]n all of those cases [the Board] could ascertain the manner in which the trial commissioners reached their conclusions, which was by weighing the probative value of conflicting contemporaneous opinions.’’
It is crucial that the trial judge's (commissioner's) order is clear as to the findings that are made and the logic path that explains what impacted credibility, as well as how the judge's (commissioner's) decisions were reached.
The Board "concluded that substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s decision," but took issue with the "manner in which the commissioner addressed" some of the evidence. It therefore vacated various "conclusions and remanded the matter for further proceedings." The Board also denied the worker's request for a new trial "before a different commissioner."
The appellate court was critical in its review. It noted that while the trial judge (Commissioner) had "noted that certain physicians had opined that the plaintiff had a work capacity, the commissioner neither indicated that she deemed those opinions to be credible nor made a finding that the plaintiff had a work capacity." In short, the order was perhaps descriptive but lacked the critical findings and conclusions necessary for the appellate court (or Board) to discern the path of the judge's analysis.
The Court also found fault with the trial judge's conclusions regarding ongoing medical care. It noted "that the parties did not receive notice and an opportunity to present argument and evidence on that issue." That is a critical due process issue in every trial: notice and the opportunity to be heard. The issues in a trial should be clearly identified at the outset.
In an aside, the Board rejected a contention of the employer/carrier regarding the medical care issue. The E/C argued that "the commissioner’s finding that the plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement . . . necessitated a determination that further medical care was palliative." The Board's rejection of this support for the necessity of such a finding was noted to be particularly founded upon the conclusion that the defendants had cited no authority to support their argument. It is important to remember in litigation to bring and cite authority.
The Board was particularly critical of the trial judge (Commissioner) as regards the evidence at trial. In describing its conclusions, it said that the "manner in which the commissioner addressed this evidence was sufficiently unorthodox as to impair" the workers' rights. This was focused on the conclusions regarding medical care that were not noticed nor litigated.
Thus, the trial judge's order was deemed insufficient. The matter was remanded back for further trial proceedings.
The Court explained that the injured worker's request for a new trial before a different commissioner had no legal foundation. This returns to the theme of bringing or citing authority.
The worker pled a Connecticut statue (§ 51-183c) which applies specifically to "judges." The Court explained that as that statute does not address commissioners, it "does not apply in the workers’ compensation forum." That is a notable point. The language of the statute was interpreted literally by the Court, again with similarity to the Kentucky discussion cited above.
And, the Court cited previous decisions in which it and the state's Supreme Court have held that the cited statute applies only to "trials" not administrative actions. Thus, the authority cited by the worker did not support the ordering of proceedings with a different Commissioner. Furthermore, the Court was supportive of the Board's denial of such reassignment based on judicial ("administrative") economy. It noted the volume of evidence already submitted and the "delay and redundancy" that would come from a de novo proceeding with a new Commissioner or judge.
Thus, the decision is of interest in three ways: the criticality of well-drafted orders, due process, and the applicability of law. In terms of the order, it is absolutely essential that the judge renders findings on the critical facts upon which the decision will rest. Those findings should be clear, concise, and readily apparent. The appellate body should not have to search for them. The order must be clear on conclusions of credibility, identifying conflicts, describing their inapposite nature or other shortcoming, and must clearly state which evidence is accepted and why.
Due process is the only product (or service) a judge (commissioner) can deliver. The parties are charged with knowing their case and pleading their claims and defenses. The parties should put their positions on the table and present the necessary elements of proof to support each. The judge (commissioner) must be able to rely upon those pleadings and evidence. When the parties do not address a topic, the judge should refrain from ruling on it. If that means that there is an issue left unadjudicated, the fault of that lies with the party that failed to plead it.
As to the law, a party should be aware of previous interpretations of the appellate bodies. Where the state's highest court has interpreted a statute (holding that it applies only to judges and trials), any allegation or argument for a different interpretation needs to be substantive, detailed, and focused. First, the challenge should acknowledge of the existing law and succinctly explain why it should be changed. A generalized request for relief that the state's highest court has already denied to others in similar circumstances is unlikely to succeed. And such a generalized, and seemingly uneducated, argument itself may impact the appellate bodies' impression of the overall tenor and persuasiveness of the appeal as a whole.
