The Florida First District Court of Appeal recently rendered Department of Health v. Gainesville Woman Care, LLC., No. 1D18-623 [August 1, 2019]. The case is not about workers' compensation, but about a statute imposing a specific informed consent regarding a medical procedure. The appellee (Gainesville Woman Care, or "GWC") challenged the statute on constitutional grounds, contending that it "on its face, violates the Florida Constitution’s right of privacy provision." Constitutional analysis has been the focus of various challenges to the Florida's workers' compensation statute, and the Court's explanation of constitutional analysis here is worthy of discussion.
The history of this challenge includes the appellee (GWC) challenging the statutory amendment shortly after it was enacted, seeking to "temporarily enjoin" enforcement of the law while the substantive challenge proceeded in the courts. This injunction was granted by The Florida Supreme Court. As the substantive challenge proceeded in the Circuit Court, "Appellees moved for final summary judgment and prevailed," meaning that the trial court concluded the law was unconstitutional on the merits of the Appellees challenge, and did so before the case made it to trial.
The First District Court reversed that conclusion and explained the distinctions between "the temporary injunction phase" and the substantive challenge. It described how the Appellees (GWC) presented evidence, in seeking the injunction. At that time, however, "the State didn’t offer any rebuttal evidence." See If You Are Not Perry Mason, Bring Evidence. Based only upon the evidence submitted by the Appellees, the injunction was granted and the challenged informed consent statute could not be enforced while the trial court proceeded with considering the merits of the challenge.
In that later consideration of the merits, Appellees sought summary judgment (without a full trial). In support, GWC argued their allegations and the fact that the Supreme Court had granted the temporary injunction. The State responded to that motion by "producing evidence supporting the law’s constitutionality." This evidence "hadn’t been offered at the temporary injunction stage of the case." Despite that evidence, the "trial court granted Appellees’ motion for final summary judgment," and concluded the informed consent statute "to be facially unconstitutional." The First District reversed that decision and remanded the case back to the trial court. Note, that the District Court did not say the law is "constitutional," it said the trial court should have proceeded to trial rather than ruling without trial in a summary manner.
The District Court explained that the evidence adduced by the State in the summary judgment proceedings established issues of "material fact as to whether the" law was constitutional. The trial court had rejected those facts, discounting the persuasiveness of the proferred evidence. Notably, the decision of the trial court was not entirely clear as to whether its decision was based on a "facial" analysis, and it cited "particular circumstances in which the law might not constitutionally apply," suggesting an "as applied" analysis. The District Court explained the distinction between the two, "facial" and "as applied," in this discussion of clarity.
The Court reminded that "summary judgment should not be granted unless the facts are so crystallized that nothing remains but questions of law.” It explained that the State opposed the initial "temporary injunction," but at that time "failed to present any evidence" of a "compelling state interest" that justified the statute. The Court described the State's evidence at that injunction stage as "feeble," in explaining why the temporary injunction was granted by the Supreme Court and the enforcement of the statute was prohibited while trial court litigation proceeded.
To the contrary, the Court noted, the Appellees (GWC) did not respond to the State's evidence on the merits in the trial court. In response to the State's evidence, the District Court concluded "Appellees are standing pat." This is critical, according to the Court, because the preliminary injunction decision is precisely that, "preliminary." It is not generally a full analysis of the facts and law, which occur in a trial on the merits, but a decision made for a temporary period based upon preliminary evidence and allegation. As such, the Supreme Court decision granting the injunction was not a decision on the merits of the law. And, furthermore, the Court noted that the decision was in some part due to "the State’s lack of evidence." As there were factual issues for resolution, the Court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate.
Thus, the conclusions seem simple. First, the State did not adequately address the request for a temporary injunction and thus the injunction was granted. Second, the GWC did not adequately address the State's evidence in the trial court, and thus granting judgment without trial was inappropriate. The process and history demonstrate the need for full and focused prosecution and defense at each stage of a proceeding.
The Court then addressed the trial court's analysis of the constitutional question, drawing a distinction between a "facial" and "as applied" determination. It reiterated the "established test for assessing facial constitutional challenges": "whether it violates the rights of all women in all circumstances." The Court compared that test to the analysis that would be appropriate for a particular person "claiming particular harms," the "as applied" analysis: whether the "Law violates the constitutional rights of some women in some circumstances." The Court reiterated this distinction and stressed that in a facial challenge, the Court should "consider only the text of the statute, not its specific application to a particular set of circumstances."
Phrased differently, the Court explained, "facial challenge (test) is not whether the . . . Law can be lawfully applied to a particular set of facts," but "whether no set of circumstances exists in which the law is constitutionally valid." The Court noted that:
"The trial court did not state whether it was invalidating the law under Florida’s traditional no-set-of-circumstances test for facial challenges. But it highlighted particular circumstances in which the law might not constitutionally apply,"
Thus, the findings of the trial court regarding the facts and circumstances of some leads perhaps to a lack of clarity in the decision. The failure of the trial court to affirmatively state its reliance on the "no-set-of circumstances" standard could perhaps leave confusion as to what standard the court applied and thereafter cause confusion as to the applicability of the court's decision to other constitutional challenges.
The District Court, in evaluating the trial court's conclusion is thus left with questions. This illustrates that it is critical in constitutional analysis to both state the standard of review applied, and to explain the factual findings pertinent to that analysis. That reminder is relevant in any trial proceeding. The decision should be sufficient to explain the outcome to the specific parties (who are already familiar with their facts and circumstances) and to any member of the public who thereafter may read the decision, and who lack any context or knowledge of the case beyond that provided by the judge in that decision. The judge's decision must be complete, accurate, and clear.
Without such clarity, a reviewing court, as well as those in other future litigation that may seek to apply the court's analysis similarly, are left without clarity as to the constitutional, or other decision, analysis. Clarity provides predictability and effectuates review and stare decisis. Stare decisis is a legal maxim that essentially holds that courts will respect and follow previous judicial decisions in deciding present disputes. It is discussed further in A Kentucky Constitutional Analysis.
Whether a constitutional decision is "facial" or "as applies" is critical in light of stare decisis. Whether a decision binds only a particular case and its parties, specifically because of the facts of that case ("as applied"), or whether the decision applies to all parties in all cases regardless of the facts ("facial") is critical information for both those parties and the public. Courts have a responsibility to be clear on the standard applied as well as the breadth and scope of such a determination of constitutionality.
The opinion in Gainesville Woman Care was not unanimous. Judge Wolf dissented. It is focused on another element of constitutionality, which requires in challenges such as this that the state prove it has a compelling interest in constraining individual rights, and that the law is "the least restrictive means of serving any compelling state interest.” Judge Wolf concludes that the trial court correctly concluded that the element was not demonstrated by the State and therefore Appellees (GWC) were entitled to summary judgment.
There follows a detailed explanation of the challenged statute, and its application to various potential challengers and potential factual situations that a person "may face," situations in which the statute might be applied. Judge Wolf concludes that "a law that forces a patient to delay medical care to the detriment of her health cannot be the least restrictive means of furthering any compelling state interest." The dissent asserts that the State has not provided evidence to "explain how a law that sweeps so broadly can be found to be the least restrictive means of serving any compelling state interest."
Academically, the decision and dissent each provide interesting reading. The perspectives offered illustrate that constitutional analysis is sometimes complex, nuanced, and subject to various perceptions. However, the value of clarity of analysis and conclusion is perhaps clear in any event. The constitutional analysis of a court is of greater value if the standard applied and factual conclusions are clearly stated and explained. This benefits the parties and the public who may later encounter the decision to seek guidance and predictability on their own issues and disputes.
