In 1987, The Princess Bride hit theaters. It is a quirky movie, which some refer to as a "cult classic." In it, the hero (Wesley, played by Cary Elwes) pursues three adventurers (seemingly villains, but they later come to help Wesley) that have kidnapped "The Princess Bride," named Buttercup. The film is replete with great quotes. I was recently reminded of an exchange between the supposed brains of the the three villains, Vizzini (played by Wallace Shawn) and Inigo Montoya (Mandy Pantikin). The brain, Vizzini, has just cut a rope that Wesley is climbing, yet Wesley does not fall:
"Vizzini: HE DIDN'T FALL? INCONCEIVABLE."
"Montoya: You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means."
In a recent educational program, I heard a judge similarly focusing the audience on the meaning of words. Words are critical to the law, particularly in the realm of interpreting writings such as statutes and contracts. What words mean matters.
There are certain approaches to statutory interpretation that are accepted in the American legal community. The subject is discussed in various publications, an excellent overview from a legal writing perspective is A Guide to Reading, Interpreting, and Applying Statutes. This is an expansive and detailed examination of interpretation from the perspective of more effective legal writing. For those who would study the employment of prose, it is detailed, informative, and helpful.
The primary rule of interpreting a statute is that the plain meaning of the statute should be applied when it is clear. In other words, the first step in interpreting is to read the language of the statute itself.
“[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Barco v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 975 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 2008).
Thus, the primary tool for interpreting a statute is the statute itself. A judge should read the language, and strive to follow its plain meaning. There have been challenges as to that process. In the Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) decision of the Florida First District Court, both the majority and dissent cited the "plain meaning," but disagreed as to what that was. The dissent contended that the majority was instead "crafting a new statute in derogation of the plain text." Thus, purportedly not an interpretation so much as a re-write. See Westphal is Over, Questions Remain.
Another interesting read is Sedgwick CMS v. Valcourt-Williams, 271 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019), reh'g denied (May 30, 2019), review denied, No. SC19-1044, ___ So. 3d. ___ (Fla. Oct. 28, 2019), which is discussed in Personal Comfort, Testing Compensability. A main focus of the Court there is interpreting words. Some will argue that another key feature is stare decisis, with both majority and dissent finding a foundation for respective positions based on the same prior decisions interpreting "arising out of" and in "the course and scope of."
In the analysis of words and meaning, "it is appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions when construing statutes or rules." This may mean reference to a general dictionary such as the Miriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary, or perhaps to a more specialized publication such as Black's Law Dictionary. Both were consulted in Barco. But, the important point is that it may well be critical to understand what the word "inconceivable" really means. It may be important for the person who writes it into an argument, rule, statute, or decision. It may be equally important thereafter when someone strives to understand and interpret what that writing means.
The legislature is tasked with making laws. It is this conglomeration of elected representatives, with the assent of an elected Governor, that must collectively change the law. That process is punctuated with opportunities for public input, open discourse, disagreement, and discussion. It is collaborative, contentious, and even combative occasionally. The Courts presume that in that process the legislative branch is "aware of case law," that is that it is aware of the Court's previous interpretations. In City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So. 2d 1196, 1202 (Fla. 2000), the Court reminded of this: “The legislature is presumed to know the judicial constructions of a law when enacting a new version."
Upon that knowledge, upon the appreciation of the interpretation, the elected representatives are certainly empowered to disagree. A prime example is the Court's interpretation of section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), the "major contributing cause" standard in Florida workers' compensation. The Court concluded that standard meant:
"if the workplace accident contributes more to the disability or need for treatment than any other single cause."
This Court interpretation was founded largely upon the legislature's use of the word "the," as in "the major contributing cause." See Closet Maid v. Sykes, 763 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
The Florida legislature responded in 2003 by amending section 440.09(1)(b):
"the employer must pay compensation or benefits required by this chapter only to the extent that the injury arising out of and in the course of employment is and remains more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined and thereafter remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment."
Whether the Legislature originally intended the outcome interpreted by the Court or intended this "more than 50 percent," The Court reached what some see as a strained (depending on the definition of the word "the") conclusion. The Legislature's intent in its correction is clear and succinct. It both changes (corrects) the Court analysis and provides clarity through specificity. This example illustrates the burden of the interpreter to follow the words of the legislature. Admittedly, there may be disagreement on such interpretation, as illustrated in the Westphal and Valcourt discussions above. But, always the elected representatives are afforded the opportunity to review such interpretation and to clarify their words as they deem appropriate.
The process is perhaps not necessarily efficient. But, the process calls upon the separate branches to remain in their lanes and to perform the functions that "we the people" designated for them in our adoption of a constitutional republic form of government. For its potential failings, ours really is perhaps "the worst form of government, except for all the others," as Winston Churchill once suggested? Certainly, it is not perfect by any means. But, if the branches remain focused on their roles, if judges remain true to words, then this imperfect system should produce consistent results for those who depend upon it. If we fail to give the plain meaning to words, well that would be "INCONCEIVABLE!" Or maybe you "do not think it means what I think it means?"
