On April 29, 2016, I was honored beyond description to be included in Kentucky's Workers' Compensation Centennial, held at the historic Buffalo Trace distillery, just down the road from the state capitol. The catering was an outstanding barbecue, the company was genial and friendly, and history was in the air. Florida has not reached the centennial of Chapter 17481, Acts 1935, § 1., the Florida Workers' Compensation Law, which remains 17 years off.
I wonder what kind of celebration Florida might hold to mark the centennial of Chapter 5966, F.S.? That is a bit of trivia for the reader. Today in Florida workers' compensation is commonly short-handed with reference to Chapter 440, F.S., where the workers' compensation law has resided since at least 1955. However, the original Florida statute was in Chapter 5966; this blog recently discussed the early days of Florida workers' compensation in Florida's Supreme Court in Workers' Compensation (July 2018).
Florida started with an administrative body, the Florida Industrial Commission. A commission chair appointed by the Governor for four years served as chair, with two designated members of the Governor's cabinet. The commission was responsible for administering the law and acted as the first level of appellate review regarding decisions on benefit disputes. As states adopted workers' compensation, there was a significant tendency to replicate other states' laws as workers' compensation was enacted. Thus, this commission structure was not uncommon. In Florida, it survived for decades but is no more.
Kentucky has, to a large extent, retained some of the early structure. It does not have a commission for management, that is the role of its Commissioner. But, Kentucky has an appellate body for such administrative determinations, the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Board. Similarly to the early Florida Commission, that Board was charged with appellate review. And, recently, I was provided with a copy of what is believed to be the first opinion of the Kentucky Board, Frank Louis Enix v. Graf-Webb Iron Mfg. Co., "Accident No. 256 - - - -Claim No. 1."
There are some interesting lessons that may be discerned from the brief opinion in Enix.
The Board noted that Mr. Enix was "a laborer employed . . . in handling scrap iron." In August 1916, he complained to his foremen about swelling and infections of both hands. The worker "testifies that he received no accidental injury." That is, there was no event or happening that resulted in the symptoms, Instead, he described that this "condition simply developed gradually." There was no "certainty whether the beginning of this condition was in August or July" (a point whose relevance is later revealed).
The Board noted that it was logical that "in handling the scrap iron" some "slivers" had "penetrated . . . his hands at various times." A physician "testified at the hearing" that "it was impossible to say with certainty whether the infected condition was due to" those slivers or "some other external cause."
The Board therefore concluded that Mr. Enix had not carried his burden of proof ("not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of this disability is an accidental injury sustained in the course of employment.") And, that he had not proven that if there was such causation that it occurred on or after August 1, 1916, the effective date of the (then) new Kentucky workers' compensation law. The date was critical for invoking the jurisdiction of the new workers' compensation system. The "accident" date is similarly often critical today in deciding which law and thereby which quantum of benefits is applicable to an injury in workers' compensation.
The Board included two paragraphs titled "Ruling of Law." It explained that the plaintiff had the burden of proof, and that to prevail "a preponderance of the evidence" must support injury by accident, arising from, and in the course and scope of employment. And, that the coverage of the law, that accident occurred when the law was in effect, must be proven by the same "preponderance."
The Board explained that its role was not to "speculate between an alternative theory which would award compensation and another which would not." The Board saw its role as determining what facts had been proven (was there competent evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions), and then to decide if the judge had appropriately applied the law to those facts. Having determined that Mr. Enix did not meet his burden of proof in the two stated regards, the Board concluded that "the defendant is not liable for compensation upon the facts presented by this record."
What lessons can be gleaned from the Board's decision?
I would suggest first that brevity is a virtue (yes, I realize that is an ironic conclusion for a Langham post). But, this first Kentucky Board decision is less than 400 words. It presents no extraneous facts whatever; it is succinct, to the point, and has handwritten corrections for typos.
Second, it reminds us that then, as now, in every case there is a party with the burden of proof. In many settings, the party seeking benefits, the worker, has that burden. Presumptions in the law may change that balance, and thus there are instances in which the employer/carrier faces that burden instead. However, in every case, some party has that burden, and failure to satisfy it means defeat.
Third, it is sometimes critical to effectively and clearly identify a "date of accident." Over the ensuing decades, legal standards for that determination have evolved and been refined. But, rights under statutes like workers' compensation are often dependent upon what the state's law said as of that date. Determining the date of accident may affect what law is applied and what benefits are awarded.
Finally, there is value in history. It has oft been said that those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it. That is a worthy admonition. Lawyers, parties, and the workers' compensation community learn from judicial decisions if they take the time to read and understand them. That is the point of this blog, and perhaps in the end someone learns something?
Shout out and thanks to Kentucky Chair Michael Alvey and Commissioner Robert Swisher for providing the Enix decision.
