In preparation for my trip to the annual WCI last summer, I penned Public Viewing OpportunityJudge Case decided Su-Ann Belle Zilnicki v. Steward Sebastian River Medical Center in October 2022. The final order includes a ruling regarding the Daubert constraint on expert testimony, conclusions about the affirmative defense of misrepresentation, and credibility determinations.
The Employer/Carrier sought rehearing, which is always an appropriate path when a party feels that there are "rulings that were outside the scope of the issues presented; or" a need for "clarification in matters of law or fact that the judge may have overlooked or misapprehended." Those are the two appropriate bases for rehearing under Rule 60Q6.122.
The motion for rehearing was denied, and the Employer/Carrier sought appellate review. The case was noticed for oral argument at the WCI conference in August. The arguments were described as interesting, animated, and informative. There were significant legal issues discussed and audience members likely gained better appreciation for the challenges of trying a case. The First District Court affirmed Judge Case's order on September 19, 2023, but without any explanation or edification.
In that, there is some letdown for the viewer. After a great oral argument, with the verve and energy that this one displayed, it seems a little anticlimactic to hear only "affirmed." The reader, viewer, observer should understand that this is the probability though. The majority of appeals end in the same manner. The last time I looked, about 78% conclude with a per curium affirmed, denied, or dismissed. The outcome remains, but the explanation and path remain forever a mystery.
The second case that was argued at the WCI was Siena v. Orange County Government. This was an interesting case from various perspectives. I overheard one attendee ask "is this workers' compensation?" I discussed the oral arguments with a judge from another jurisdiction who asked "is this the only cancer reference in the Florida law?" These are both valid questions and highlight for me the value of this very public oral argument (they are all public, but not as accessible), and the court's written opinion delivered on October 23, 2023.
I have heard some of the inquiries before. People who thrive in the world of workers' compensation tend to be rather unifaceted. We get together at cocktail parties, after long days of studying and interpreting this law, and we avoid talk of football, fashion, and even the Kardashians. For some unfathomable reason, we talk about workers' compensation. It is worse when our curiosity is piqued.
So, does Florida workers' compensation have a cancer benefit? The answer delivered by the court is yes. The court in Siena addressed the interaction between two sections of the law, section 112.1816 and section 440.16, one of which is workers' compensation. Section 440.16 is the definition and distribution of benefits in the event of a workplace death.
The manner in which the law was structured led to a need for interpretation and coalescing. The opinion notes that the challenge there revolved around the use of words. The facts of the case are reasonably simple, involving "a firefighter who died of brain cancer." His survivors had asked for benefits under both statute sections. The "benefits under subsection 112.1816(2)," are not as robust as the broader benefits in the workers' compensation law.
Therefore, after receiving those chapter 112 benefits, workers' compensation benefits were sought. The trial judge denied the section 440.16 benefits. That conclusion was based on a conclusion of an "election of remedy" in seeking and accepting the section 112.1816 benefits. Part of that statute characterizes benefits “as an alternative to pursuing workers’ compensation benefits under chapter 440.” The trial judge was persuaded that this meant that one or the other, but not both, might be due.
The court noted that another portion of the section 112.1816 language refers to “all of the benefits arising out of such death," and another paragraph makes reference to “in addition to any workers’ compensation.” The court acknowledged the "alternative," but was persuaded by the references to "addition" and "all." The court sought to reconcile the potential for conflict in these words.
It concluded that "the context of all three of those statutory provisions" supports the conclusion that the "alternative" provision does not apply "to death benefits available elsewhere in chapter 112, nor to chapter 440 death benefits." That limitation ceases to apply "upon the injured worker's death." Therefore, the "alternative" language has some limiting effect on an injured worker, but not specifically as to the death benefits as sought in this case.
The court therefore vacated the trial judge's order.
The discussion from the court is informative and helpful. There is an opportunity here for education for the entire workers' compensation community. There should be no conclusion that value is limited, only benefitting those who work with the specific population of first responders and their special benefits.
The court's analysis is far broader, providing insight into the complexity that can result from the use of various words. That analysis here is about the cancer statute, but the methodology and logic path for dealing with perceived conflicting language is of merit in the broader context of statutory interpretation. We all remind ourselves persistently that workers' compensation is all statutory. This interpretational challenge will thus persist in many instances, and the court's description of the process illuminates that.
There will be opportunities for attendance at oral arguments and exposure to these kinds of issues. Those who would strive for comprehension of the world of workers' compensation would be well served by attending, discussing, and studying such opportunities.
