A Philadelphia Judge raised the discussion of disqualification last July in a high-profile case involving a large consolidated tort claim. The story was interesting from multiple perspectives, including evidence, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and court rules.
One of the firms involved in that litigation has sought to have the judge removed because of "his wife's employment history." Legal Newsline reported that the lawsuit alleges a medication is tied to cancer and that it is based on science that other judges have found lacking.
Details on a Delaware dismissal are featured in a Wall Street Journal republication on PubMed describing "junk science" and "a debunking for the ages." It is fair to say that there are critics of the science underlying the litigation and that similar recovery has been pursued in various jurisdictions.
The subject of evidence sufficiency has been addressed here before. See Daubert Better Explained (May 2016); Daubert's New Day (May 2019); and Daubert in the Courtroom (August 2019). Daubert is tough. I watched a young lawyer in a recent class struggle to build an excellent foundation for the objection.
That student ultimately concluded not by asking to strike the offending, unscientific opinion(s), but by asking to strike the offending witness for lack of expertise. A subtle difference, but a critical point worthy of attention.
The litigator's job is to convince the judge that (1) they have authority to act and (2) that they should act. Authority and imperative. But the Daubert objection is to the admissibility of expert opinion, not the qualification of the expert per se. The Student's efforts were solid, but the conclusion was a bit off-target.
One of the great challenges of the Daubert analysis is that humans seek definitive answers. Whether expert scientific testimony is admissible in a given case often comes down to an answer lawyers dislike: "it depends."
That "it depends" is part of the frustration. What it depends on is the other shoe that drops. What is the particular case about? What will the specific evidence demonstrate? What is its foundation, replicability, acceptance in the scientific community, and more? The analysis may be fact-specific, and the arguments may be unique to any particular case.
But on to the effort to remove the judge. In this instance, the judge's wife is a partner in a law firm that represents "a defendant in only one of the 599 cases." Someone has taken testimony to establish that the spouse's income is not "directly related" to the "fees or income made from" that defendant. Nonetheless, one of the other parties has sought to disqualify the judge on the basis of his wife's employment/ownership at that law firm.
The judge entered an order in April declining to step aside (disqualification). Westlaw Today reported in April 2026. A main theme in this is timeliness. The judge noted that the motion for him to be removed came "eight months after he disclosed his wife’s new job." The motion was apparently raised again in July and denied again.
As an aside, "recuse" and "disqualify" are often used interchangeably. Nonetheless, they are not synonyms. See Lessons in Recusal and Disqualification (July 2017) and Bigfoot, Unicorns, and Predictability (February 2023). But I have noted before that Pennsylvania has distinctions. See Recusal Lessons from Pennsylvania (February 2018).
The judge's April order is brief and conclusory but has lengthy footnotes with various findings of fact. The Bressler Blog describes findings regarding the disclosure, the parties, and their counsel. Nonetheless, the conclusion seems focused on the timing. Notably, in Florida, a judge is not permitted to proceed to such fact-finding; see below. This illustrates that the disqualification foundations depend on various state laws and regulations.
Law.com (paywall) reported more recently that the judge was displeased with the repeated July efforts at disqualification (though mislabeled "recuse"). There is a suggestion by the judge that the efforts "may have crossed the line into violations of the conduct rules." Such a response in Florida might itself create the very level of conflict to compel the judge's removal.
The reference to the "conduct rules" and allegations that the party's lawyer may have crossed a line is not a ruling on the four corners of the disqualification motion. Those allegations could be seen as a conflict between counsel and bench that justifies disqualification.
In Florida, the disqualification of judges is addressed in the Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration, Rule 2.330 (which is not applicable in workers' compensation by its own authority but which is applicable due to its adoption/incorporation in Rule 6.126 of the Chapter 60Q-6 Rules of Procedure for Workers' Compensation Adjudications).
The details in Rule 2.330(c) are notable. The rule requires a written motion, specific facts, and recitation of "the precise date when the facts constituting the grounds for the motion were discovered" by either the party or their attorney ("whichever is earlier"). That can be a critical point.
The criticality of the time disclosure is in Rule 2.330(g), which allows filing such a disqualification motion "within a reasonable time not to exceed 20 days after discovery by the party" (or attorney, "whichever is earlier") of the facts underlying the motion. The provision is specific and focuses on both the knowledge of the party and counsel.
It appears the subject case has been ongoing for years. When did the attorneys learn of the judge's spouse and her employment? The implication seems to support that they learned if some 8 months prior to seeking relief. That might be excused in some settings, but 8 months does seem a long time.
The other important provision is Rule 2.330(h), which limits the Florida judge's analysis to "only the legal sufficiency of the motion," adding that the judge "shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged" (perhaps such as the spouse's income, involvement, sequestration, and more).
The Florida courts have consistently concluded that:
- A judge's "adverse ruling against" a party "is not a sufficient basis to warrant disqualification. See Pilkington v. Pilkington, 182 So. 3d 776, 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).
- That a judge has "made several highly questionable rulings is not a basis for disqualification. see Eisenberg v. City of Miami Beach, 714 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- That "a trial judge has made an error of law is not a basis for disqualification.” (Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 692 (Fla. 1995).
The bottom line is that a judge addressing such a motion must consider legal sufficiency and timeliness. Those topics should be paramount. If a motion fails on one or both counts, it should be denied.
